PPP异化为地方政府隐性债务风险的差异性研究——基于资本结构视角

As a governance tool, however, public private partnership (PPP) in China has dissimilated into a financing vehicle for local government and contributed to newly-formed hidden liabilities. As one of the key targets of preventing and controlling systematic financial risks, the undergoing one-size-fits-all strategy leads PPP development in China into a doomed cycle whereby promoting PPP leads to disorder at local level which, in turn, leads to tighter top-down control, thus ending the PPP employment. To take targeted measures in preventing and controlling PPP from dissimilating into local government hidden liabilities, the key is to identify structural and size differences of PPP hidden liabilities and their generative mechanisms. Focusing on capital structure of PPP project, the research constructs a system to identify the government liabilities hidden in PPP projects. To quantify both of government liabilities hidden in PPP projects and its differences, based on identification system and project and transaction databases, the research at first justifies whether a PPP project is disguised government liabilities or not by conducting content analysis, and then calculates the structure index and size index of those PPP projects as hidden liabilities. Finally, the distribution can be detected via cluster analysis. Based on corporate capital structure theory, the research sets up a theoretical framework to analyze local government financing choices. PPP financing, together with fiscal funds and debt financing, constitutes local government financing capital structure. However, regarding of information asymmetry, agency costs and control rights distribution, local government’s decision on how to finance a project is actually the result of rounds of interaction among local government, central government, the market and the society. Thus, to explain the structural and size differences regarding to PPP as hidden liabilities, the research furtherly puts forward four hypotheses along with local government financing capital structure, consisting of debt financing preference hypothesis, conspiracy hypothesis, reverse rent-seeking hypothesis and risks transfer hypothesis. The research can contribute to existing institution-centered and government-centered study on PPP as hidden liabilities from point of interaction. What’s more, the ‘structure-size’ methods to detect and quantify government liabilities hidden in PPP projects put forward by the research may contribute to more targeted measures when preventing and controlling PPP hidden liabilities.

PPP异化为地方政府融资平台并构成隐性债务风险增量，成为防控系统性金融风险的重点之一，但一刀切式防控使中国PPP发展陷入“一放就乱、一管就死”的怪圈。精准防控的关键是识别PPP异化的差异性及其生成机理。聚焦PPP项目资本结构，本研究构建PPP隐性债务风险识别体系，基于项目库、交易文本库，运用文本分析法挖掘数据，判断项目是否异化并计算异化结构指数和异化规模指数，量化PPP隐性债务风险及其差异性，通过聚类呈现分布；基于企业资本结构理论，本研究构建地方政府资本结构理论框架，围绕多个行动者和互动机制，提出债务融资偏好假说、合谋假说、反向寻租假说、风险转嫁假说，基于项目相关数据库和地方政府融资数据库，通过相关分析、回归分析，解释PPP异化差异性的生成机理。本项目从互动角度补充当前以制度和政府为中心对PPP隐性债务风险的研究，从“结构-规模”角度对PPP隐性债务风险的甄别及量化为精准防控提供对策。

当前我国地方债务风险总体可控，但地方政府违规或变相举债形成的隐性债务风险不容忽视摸清PPP政府隐性债务风险底数、差异性及其生成机理，是打好防范化解重大风险攻坚战的重要一役。本项目具体研究内容包括：第一，识别PPP异化为地方隐性债务风险的差异性，包括不同异化途径、不同行业领域、不同地域及不同社会资本方；第二，解释PPP异化为地方隐性债务风险差异性的生成机理。依托本课题，课题组取得了一系列学术成果。第一，项目负责人目前已正式发表本课题相关论文2篇，其中标注本项目资助的1篇，1篇英文论文处于投稿过程中，2篇英文论文处于修改完善中，2篇中文论文处于写作中。.在研究发现方面，基于政企关系理论与资本结构理论，结合量化研究和典型案例研究，课题组核心观点是政企双方围绕信息、代理成本、控制权要素进行的不同互动结果导致PPP隐性债务风险及其差异性。2篇已发表论文进一步通过实证分析发现：政府拥有的信息不充足、缺乏知识和经验，并且依赖从私人资本那里获得资源而让渡部分控制权，导致政府与私人部门之间产生谈判能力不对等，进而产生不对等的权力关系，结果是风险分配更有利于强势一方。具体的，为吸引市场投资者并加速项目落地，政府不得不向市场妥协而承担更多风险，产生PPP隐性债务风险；不对等权力关系的动态变化过程又进一步调整了该风险产生、规模及分配。在数据库建设方面，课题组构建了多个数据库：地方政府融资结构数据库、PPP政策文本数据库、PPP裁判文书数据库、城市水务PPP项目数据库等。.本项目从政企关系和资本结构理论角度揭示PPP异化为地方政府隐性债务风险的差异性及其机理，丰富了已有关于地方政府隐性债务风险、PPP政府性债务风险的相关研究，研究发现对于精准防控PPP隐性债务风险、有效发挥PPP公共服务供给功能具有重要现实意义。本项目的数据库一方面用于科学研究，对话发展中国家基础设施融资、PPP再谈判、中国外资奇迹等既有研究；另一方面可以服务政策实践，回应PPP规范发展、城市公用事业改革等问题。