食品质量可追溯监管的长效机制及政策仿真研究

It is an urgent and significant project in practice that we should strengthen the regulation of food traceability in our country.From the perspective of industrial organization form, this study takes into full consideration how horizontal competition and vertical competition-cooperation between firms influence the effects of food traceability regulation，and reveals the potential risks if the food traceability regulation is implemented simply and forcibly, and points out the importance and urgency of building a long-term regulatory mechanism. Within the framework of interactive game between competition-cooperation behavior and regulation policy, 3 models of long-term regulatory mechanism sequentially will be built, and the economic logic and policy implications will be uncovered by the models. On this base, by the simulation of mechanism policy,supporting policies of regulatory mechanism will be raised. This study has three innovations:first,adopts perspective of industrial organization form to consider food traceability regulation within framework of interactive game between competition-cooperation behavior and regulation policy.Second, focuses on risks of food traceability regulation and long-term regulatory mechanism which is neglected by former rerearches,and analyzes liability allocation of food safety accidents which is not yet concerned enough from the perspective of liability’s traceability.Third, being different from management literatures that are good at qualitative research or econometric analysis and from economics literature within the principal agent framework, employs the method of combinations of game theory modeling analysis ,economic analysis of tort liability and the Multi-agent modeling simulation.

加强食品质量可追溯监管是当前食品安全政策实践领域亟需解决的重大课题。项目以产业组织形态为视角，充分考虑企业横向竞争和纵向竞合对监管效果的影响，指出简单强力推进可追溯监管的潜在风险和长效机制构建的重要性、紧迫性。在企业竞合和监管政策互动博弈框架下，顺次建立监管长效机制的三个理论模型，揭示长效机制所应具备的经济逻辑及政策内涵。在此基础上，通过机制政策仿真模拟，提出与监管长效机制相配套的支持政策。创新之处：①突破现有文献单一的产业链分析，采用纵向产业链与横向市场结构相结合的产业组织形态视角，在横纵企业竞合与监管政策互动博弈中考察可追溯监管问题；②聚焦于现有研究忽视的监管风险及长效机制构建，集中分析当前尚未充分关注的责任追溯理解下的食品安全事故责任配置；③有别于以质性研究或计量分析见长的管理学文献和委托代理框架下的经济学文献，采用博弈建模分析、侵权责任法经济学分析和多主体建模仿真模拟相结合的方法。

加强食品质量可追溯监管是食品安全政策实践领域亟需解决的重大课题。本项目以产业组织形态为视角，采用理论建模、侵权责任法经济学和仿真模拟相结合的方法，通过理论建模和仿真分析，揭示了简单强力推进食品质量可追溯监管存在的导致食品质量下降的潜在风险，指出建立激励性可追溯监管长效机制的重要性、紧迫性；剖析了激励性食品质量可追溯监管长效机制四个子机制的内在经济逻辑及其政策含义，在此基础上提出了注重行业差别化的激励性食品质量可追溯监管及配套支持政策。.课题研究表明：简单强力推进食品质量可追溯监管存在导致食品质量下降的潜在风险；最优可追溯监管强度与食品边际质量成本、可追溯生产成本、实质价格、质量事故罚金、食品安全事故中消费者无法补偿的损失比例等负相关，与纵向生产环节数量正相关；可追溯监管的中间产品质量提升效果受中间产品质量成本、质量标准、边际检测成本和质量事故处罚金额影响；下游企业作为食品安全首要责任人是可追溯监管的合理制度安排，但其效果与产业组织形态差异有关。上游企业产品质量决策受下游企业行为、可追溯强度和产业组织形态影响。公众参与可追溯监管的程度，受公众参与能力及监管部门给予的参与空间大小影响；食品质量可追溯监管长效机制及政策构建应重点考虑食品行业在消费者质量需求特征、质量成本、中间产品检测成本和产业组织形态上的关键差异，实行差别化的激励性食品质量可追溯监管政策；同时，还要在可追溯生产补贴、可追溯食品市场培育、公众参与监管等方面，辅之以行业差别化的食品质量可追溯监管配套支持政策。.本研究的科学意义在于突破现有文献单一的产业链分析，采用纵向产业链与横向市场结构相结合的产业组织形态视角，在企业竞合与监管政策博弈中考察可追溯监管问题,拓宽研究视野，拓展、完善食品可追溯监管研究的层次及内容，推进研究进展。项目提出的注重行业差别的激励性食品质量可追溯监管及配套支持政策，对于监管部门决策有较大参考价值。