地方政府竞争引致创新要素空间错配及效率损失研究

It is to be explored in the project according to the practical problem of “surge in innovation input but low efficiency” with innovation-driven development, the spatial misallocation of innovation elements and the extent of regional innovation performance loss in China caused by local government competition will be researched with theoretical and empirical methods. First, the extended neoclassical model and “core-edge” model is going to be constructed in which the government competition is taken as the impact variable and spatial affecting factors are included. Through the analysis of static equilibrium, dynamic equilibrium and general equilibrium state, the theoretical mechanism of misallocation of innovation Elements in both intraregional and interregional and innovation efficiency loss caused by local government competition is deduced. Second, KPSM-DID, DSDM and MPTR will be constructed to test the relationship between the misallocation of innovation elements and the local government competition, and then the innovation efficiency loss and changing trend will be estimated by tornqvist index and SFA. At last, from the perspective of straightening out the governance structure among local governments and releasing the spatial allocation dividend of innovation elements, the rationalization proposal of regional innovation efficiency will be put forward. With the efforts, the awareness of the negative impact of local government competition is aroused. In the research, the appropriate policy suggestions echo the development idea of continuously deepening the reform of “deregulation and service” under the strategy of innovation-driven development.

本项目立足于“创新投入激增但效率不高”的现实问题，在创新驱动发展的要求下，将理论与实证相结合，研究地方政府竞争引致创新要素空间错配及效率损失的理论机制及客观效应。首先，以地方政府竞争为冲击变量，纳入空间影响因素，构建拓展的新古典模型与“核心—边缘”模型，通过对静态、动态及一般均衡条件分析，推演地方政府竞争引致创新要素空间错配及效率损失的作用机制。其次，综合使用核匹配倍差法、动态空间面板计量模型、多重面板门限模型检验地方政府竞争引致的创新要素空间错配效应，进而使用托恩奎斯特指数法、数据包络分析法等测算创新效率损失程度及变动趋势。最后，从理顺地方政府间治理结构，释放创新要素空间配置红利的角度，提出了提升区域创新效率的合理化建议。项目深化了对地方政府竞争的负面影响效应认识，呼应了创新驱动发展战略下持续深化“放管服”改革的发展思路。

结合创新驱动战略的发展目标，释放创新要素配置红利、提升创新效率已成为现阶段发展的客观需求。发展实践中的特征事实表明，我国存在创新要素投入强度大但创新效率不高的现实问题，而从地方政府竞争的视角出发，有助于厘清创新要素空间错配形成机制，也有助于解释区域创新效率损失的成因及机制。在此背景下，本项目将理论建构与实证研究相结合，研究地方政府竞争、创新要素空间错配与创新效率损失之间的关系。主要研究内容及结果如下：一是基于扩展的新古典及核心-边缘模型，分层模拟地方政府竞争引致创新要素区域空间及产业空间错配的形成机制，进一步推演对创新效率的传导过程，并从地方政府竞争手段异质性、区域异质性、创新要素异质性等维度扩展基准模型，形成理论假说；二是对我国创新要素空间错配进行综合测度并分析变动趋势，借鉴多部门竞争一般均衡模型，构建创新要素空间错配测度函数，测算发现创新人力要素空间错配呈“V”型变动，创新资本要素呈“N”型变动，进一步讨论了不同空间尺度下创新要素错配的变动趋势；三是基于特征事实分析，结合嵌套空间模型（GNSM）和反事实检验思路，地方政府竞争引致创新要素空间错配及效率损失的实证检验，结果发现，地方政府制度竞争引致创新效率损失大于支出与税收竞争，且呈现出显著的空间异质性以及时域动态变动特征；四是从审慎实施制度竞争、理顺政府间“竞合关系”、积极培育创新人才等维度，设计对策建议；五是分别从人才政策竞争、税收竞争、营商环境改革、创新主体协作等角度，分析地方政府竞争对创新要素空间配置的影响，进一步讨论对区域创新绩效的影响机制。本项目从地方政府竞争下创新要素空间错配的角度，解释分析区域创新绩效效率损失问题，设计提升区域创新能力和效率的合理化建议，并呼应了创新驱动发展战略下持续深化“放管服”改革的发展思路目标任务。