官员动机、政府治理与地方预决算披露质量

In western countries, scholars study the influence of politicians’ vote-maximization motivation on the financial information disclosure quality of local governments based on electoral system. However in China, the centralized political system and decentralized economic system shape the behavioral incentives of local officials to be responsible to higher authority, get politically promoted and compete among districts. And furthermore, under the constraints of internal balance mechanisms like rotation rule of officials across different districts as well as external governance environment like public pressure, the behavioral incentives of local officials are transformed into the behavior of disclosing local governments’ budgets and final accounts. Our project systematically develops an evaluation system of the disclosure quality of local governments’ budgets and final accounts for the first time, distinguishes between the quality of mandatory disclosure following the requirements of Central Government and the quality of voluntary disclosure which is provided by the local governments and exceeds the requirements of Central Government, and designs auxiliary index （such as Cook index） for detecting outliers. After quantifying the disclosure quality of local governments’ budgets and final accounts and thus building a database, we empirically analyze the influence of cadre incentives on the disclosure quality of local governments’ budgets and final accounts, and investigate the moderating effect of government internal system and external governance mechanism. In order to alleviate the endogeneity, we take advantage of exogenous policy shocks like the reform program to replace business tax with value-added tax, and use DID approach to identify the causality. Our project adds to the application into authoritarian system of public accountability theory developed under western electoral system, tentatively summarizes governmental financial information disclosure theory suitable for China, and makes policy suggestions from the perspective of motivating local officials to improve the information disclosure quality of government budgets and final accounts.

西方学者基于选举制度研究政治家选票最大化动机对地方政府财务信息披露质量的影响。但中国地方官员进行预决算披露决策时，受制于中央政治集权与地方经济分权体制，同时具备“对上”负责和追求晋升的双重动机，并在异地任职、政府审计等内部治理机制与公众、媒体压力等外部治理环境的共同影响下，最终体现为不同的预决算披露质量。本项目系统地构建地方预决算披露质量评价体系，区分遵循中央统一规则的强制披露行为与强制规则之外的自愿披露行为，定量评价地方预决算披露质量。在此基础上，实证分析官员动机对地方预决算披露质量的影响，并考察政府内部与外部治理机制在其中的调节作用。为缓解内生性，我们选择“营改增”试点改革和地方官员换届等外生冲击，采用倍差法对上述影响进行因果识别。本项目补充西方公共受托责任理论在威权体制下的应用，尝试性地提炼适用于中国的政府财务信息披露理论，并从激发地方官员动机角度，为提升预决算披露质量提出政策建议。

如何激励地方官员提升财务信息披露质量是公共受托责任理论的本源性问题。但已有文献主要聚焦于西方选举制度，对任命制政府财务信息披露质量的影响因素及作用机理关注不足。本项目在手工收集并计算我国省级决算披露质量数据的基础上，实证检验了省级行政首长效用目标对政府决算披露策略的影响。研究发现：相对于任期中其他年份，省级行政首长在任职首年与末年，自愿披露了更高质量的决算信息。该发现在采取任期二次项模型、控制政治周期后依旧保持稳健。而执政业绩、职位变更预期与晋升压力是影响官员任期末年决算披露质量提升程度的重要因素。在决算公开后果检验中，公众对政府满意度及信任度的增强是官员自愿提升决算披露质量的直接后果。且自发提升决算披露质量能够显著增强官员任期内执政业绩对其晋升概率的正向影响。.此外，我们调查了市长在面对政治风险时的地方政府“三公”经费信息披露决策行为。相对于那些政治关系未发生变化的地级市市长而言，当市长失去省级主要官员的政治庇护后，他们显著降低了“三公”经费的披露质量。在地方政府经济发展水平较高时，或者市长上任的年龄小于55岁时，市长往往具备晋升动机，缓解了政治庇护丧失对“三公”经费披露的负向影响。但对于那些存在GDP粉饰可能性较大的地方政府，以及审计发现问题涉及金额较多的地方政府，市长往往存在信息造假可能，进一步会增强了政治庇护丧失对“三公”经费披露的负向影响。在市长丧失政治庇护后，更高质量地披露“三公”经费信息将增强政治庇护丧失与晋升概率之间的负向关系。.本项目从官员效用目标视角，在区分国家强制披露要求与官员自愿披露动机的基础上，实证检验了任命制政体下政府财务信息披露决策背后的微观逻辑，进而为我国建设“透明政府”和“责任政府”，提升政府治理水平，提供了决算公开维度的政策建议。