基于控股股东市场择时动机的公司投融资行为研究

How equity market timing affects corporate investment and financing decisions is an important issue in the literature of behavioral corporate finance, as well a much-discussed topic in practice for the resource allocation function of stock markets. Based on the corporate governance where the ownership structure is dispersed, previous studies investigated the mechanism of market timing on corporate investment and financing decisions from the perspective of managers. This work deals with the effects of market timing on corporate investment and financing decisions from the perspective of the controlling shareholder, in which the ownership structure is highly concentrated in the case of Chinese listed companies. We first build model to standardize the controlling shareholder's motivation for market timing through manipulating earnings to affect stock price, which is in the benefit of the controlling shareholder. We then conduct the inherent relationship between earnings management and market timing and proxy for market timing by the indicators of accrual and real-based earnings management. Further we examine the controlling shareholder's market timing motivation around SEOs and its impact on corporate investment and financing decisions. Finally, we investigate the impact of the controlling shareholder's market timing motivation on the subsequent performance of corporate investment and financing decisions, and deal with the puzzle of the post-SEO performance decline for Chinese listed companies. Our work contributes to the existing market timing literature from the framework, content and methodology, and would be benefit to the regulation of capital markets in China and improve the corporate governance mechanism and hence, optimize the investment and financing decisions of Chinese listed companies.

市场时机如何影响公司投融资是行为公司金融研究的理论前沿，也是股市资源配置功能探讨的热点问题。已有的研究基于股权相对分散的公司治理背景，从管理者行为视角对市场时机作用于公司投融资的一般机理进行了探讨。本课题立足于我国上市公司股权结构高度集中的特点，从控股股东行为视角研究市场时机对公司投融资的影响。我们首先构建控股股东追求自身利益最大化操纵盈余影响股价的市场时机模型，然后分析盈余管理与市场时机之间的内在关系并估计会计盈余管理和真实盈余管理市场时机指标，在此基础上实证检验股权再融资过程中控股股东的市场择时动机及其对公司投融资的影响，最后考察控股股东市场择时动机作用于公司投融资的经济后果并探讨中国上市公司"股权再融资后业绩下降之谜"。本课题的研究将从研究视角、研究内容以及研究方法上丰富现有的市场时机理论并进行有益的拓展，进而为完善我国资本市场监管、改善公司治理机制和优化公司投融资行为提供理论指导。

本课题立足于我国上市公司股权结构高度集中的特点，从控股股东行为视角考察市场时机对公司投融资的影响。研究结果发现：（1）在资本市场有效程度较低和公司股权结构集中的情况下，市场时机和股权再融资存在相互作用的内生关系，公司股权再融资过程中控股股东有强烈动机操纵盈余影响股价以创造股权再融资的市场时机并进行择时融资；（2）在市场时机高涨的情况下，控股股东可能利用股价高估的“机会窗口”实施股权再融资，并迎合投资者情绪进行过度投资；（3）高质量公司可以通过真实盈余管理调整后的账面盈余进行信号传递，真实盈余管理使得高成长性公司的权益资本成本下降而低成长性公司的权益资本成本上升；（4）代理问题严重程度不同的公司发放现金股利的价值效应存在差异，相比于控股股东协同效应较强的公司，当控股股东表现为利益侵占时，公司支付现金股利的治理作用较强，现金股利的价值效应较大。在项目组全体成员的共同努力下，本项目最终取得了丰硕的研究成果，并在《金融研究》、《管理科学》、《经济管理》、《International Review of Economics and Finance》等国内外权威及核心期刊发表论文14篇。此外，本项目还多次资助课题组成员参加国内外高水平学术会议，培养了多名硕士和博士研究生。