基于制度视角的跨期动态CEO薪酬激励定价及其治理绩效研究

Focusing on the heated debate on whether CEO Incentive is over-paid over the world, the project intends to research on the problem of CEO governance within China's socialist market economy system. The research goal mainly includes analysis of the mechanism of CEO incentive pricing (payment level and structure) and Efficiency of Governaning performance under the new framework of Chinese macro-economic system and the constraints of institutions' factors, such as Chinese politics, Culture, Ownership structure, Laws and regulations and so on, in order to find out the reasonable solution of certain Income Assignment System in Chinese market. The project will construct the cross-time dynamic CEO Incentive Assignment model under Chinese Macro-economic system which includes: ① Ananlyzing and stimulating the scenario CEO pricing Models by using Matlab tools to calibrate the Assignment Model from Solow-Swan and Extreme Value Theory (EVT) in terms of the governacing difference and derivation (eg. Incentive Effect Vs. Entrenchment Effect) under the combined constraits of ownership structure and institutions, for instance, considering such situations as divesturing the monopoly advantages of State Owned-Enterprises(SOEs), the Non-Normal distribution of CEO talents and ablility, and the efficiency of Stock incentive, to adjust the parameters and the coefficients of models, and finally settling the suitable Chinese CEO pricing model; ② Building the Cross-time Multi-interests Group Gaming model within the broad of directors for amending the available Chinese CEO Incentive Modes or patterns by integrating the prospect theory of behavioral finance, information game theory and other theories to confirm the CEO incentive effects under different situations such as under-incentive pay/over-pay/ Luck imapact etc. Based on the models above, the project does empirical studies by collecting the sample pools from Chinese listed companies and dealing with the real situation in China market through studying the long-term CEO incentive behavior options (eg. CEO's political promotion, investment propensity and Cross-listing) as well as testing the effects of the finance policies or finance regulations of Chinese government. As a result, it plans to provide some reasonable explanations and solutions of financial policy for the long-term Chinese CEO dynamic compensation incentive and income distribution system in the environment of China's socialist market economy system.

针对当前CEO激励过度等激烈争论，为解决中国社会主义市场经济环境下的CEO治理难题，本项目最为关键的目的就是在中国特定制度这一创新视角下，研究我国股权、律法条规等对CEO薪酬激励的定价（水平和结构）及其治理绩效的影响机理，为我国收入分配机制提供依据。 构建考虑制度约束集下的跨期动态CEO激励分配模型：①依据股权与制度联合约束下的治理偏差（激励Vs壁垒效应），剥离国有垄断优势、才能的非正态分布、股权激励等，用Matlab和极值理论（EVT）校正参数，模拟情境CEO定价模型；②集成行为金融前景理论、信息博弈论构建董事会跨期博弈模型，确定不同情境下的CEO激励效果（激励不足/过度/幸运冲击），选择我国CEO激励模式。 基于上述模型，考察中国CEO激励现实行为选择（如政治升迁、投资倾向、交叉上市）及政策效果的大样本实证检验，为中国社会主义市场经济下的CEO长期动态激励与收入分配提供金融政策解释。

当前，中国经济金融法律等制度环境快速发展的大背景下，中国企业现代化面对多元化股权、多重公司治理目标等挑战，尤其企业CEO激励机制改革的复杂性与特殊性引发了社会各界关于CEO 激励过度、激励不合理等诸多争议。为解决中国社会主义市场经济环境下的CEO激励与治理难题，本项目基于中国经济金融社会发展这一创新视角，研究跨期中国社会分配体制下，股权和律法条规等对CEO人力资源定价和治理绩效的影响，探索其机理，为中国社会经济发展收入分配机制提供依据。.本项目主要的研究成果：（1）建立跨期CEO薪酬激励模型，基于理论模型刻画不同情境下的最优CEO激励合约。基于CEO天赋的极值分布(EVT)，本课题构建一般动态均衡分配模型解释现实中“明星经理人”现象；基于国有企业治理目标的特殊性，从实物期权角度刻画隐形政治激励考察国有企业经理人最优薪酬结构；基于行为金融的“前景理论”，构建损失厌恶型的CEO效用函数，考察期权激励的合理性问题。（2）中国上市公司CEO薪酬激励水平与结构及其治理绩效的实证分析。主要利用2005-2016年公司面板数据，依据CEO薪酬从禀赋、非常规冲击等不同方面分解来衡量薪酬水平的合理性，并考察CEO薪酬对其行为及公司业绩的影响。（3）基于行为效用函数与博弈模型，考虑不同治理目标与特定治理机制下的CEO激励效应，发现中国CEO激励水平正态与极端分布情形。分析我国制度环境与股权类型、治理目标之间的关联度和偏差，修正公司CEO治理目标函数，并将制度与股权作为约束条件，通过调整的薪酬定价模型与CEO激励效用函数对比分析，检验中国CEO激励定价水平合理性。(4)依托最优契约理论、经理人市场理论，论证中国公司高管薪酬高增长与业绩分离现象，分析幸运薪酬、同业薪酬的厚尾分布特性，为高管的揩油还是辩护行为提供了依据。（5）中国国有企业经理人薪酬管制的政策效果评估研究。针对2009/2014年央企高管“限薪令”，考察外生薪酬管制对处于竞争性和垄断性行业央企的不同政策效果。通过对中国CEO 激励与治理绩效的经济学基础的分析以及现实规律的实证检验，本项目的研究结果为中国社会主义市场经济下的CEO 长期动态激励与收入分配提供了理论支撑与政策建议。