高管业绩薪酬激励计划影响盈余管理的机理及其经济后果：基于跨期动态契约的视角

Nowadays top executives’ compensation has been so high that it has become one of most serious problems in listed companies, which people have been focused on in our society. Theoretically, top executives’ performance-based compensation incentive contracts have made it easier for managers to take full advantage of earning management behavior from their controlling rights and improve their own compensation levels. Therefore, it is significantly important in areas such as how to promote the reform of state-owned enterprises and improve the governance efficiency, the ability of sustainable development and investment value of Companies listed. Based on executive power hypothesis, the optimal compensation contract hypothesis and behavioral compensation contract hypothesis, this project will collect the data from A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen Securities Exchange and do some research on causes and effects of executives’ performance-based pay on earnings management (accruals and real activities manipulation) around the state intervention, common agency, political connection, executive behavior under the background of government regulation from the point of view of intertemporal dynamic contract, utilizing such econometric tools as the treatment effects model, difference-in-difference–in-difference method, synthetic control method, threshold panel regression, quantile regression and dynamic panel method. The project is expected to provide the scientific basis for perfecting executive compensation contract arrangement, upgrading the internal governance mechanism such as earnings management in companies listed and promoting the Chinese capital market system.

上市公司高管薪酬畸高一直是社会关注的焦点。从理论来看，业绩薪酬激励契约容易诱使高管通过盈余管理行为来提高自身薪酬，因此，研究业绩薪酬激励计划影响盈余管理的前因后果、治理规制及其绩效，对深化国企改革、提高上市公司治理效率、可持续发展能力和投资价值具有重要的理论价值和现实意义。项目拟基于高管权力假说、最优薪酬契约假说和行为薪酬契约假说，收集历年沪深上市公司数据，运用处理效应模型、三重差分法、合成控制法、门限面板回归、分位数回归及动态面板等计量方法，从跨期动态契约角度围绕国家干预、共同代理、政治联系、高管行为等方面挖掘政府规制背景下的上市公司高管业绩薪酬治理对盈余管理（应计项目操控和真实活动操控）的影响机理和经济后果，并揭示这种作用链条对公司绩效的影响及其监管机制。预计本项目能够为完善高管薪酬契约制度安排、改进上市公司盈余管理等内部治理机制和推动资本市场制度建设提供科学依据。

项目从跨期动态契约角度围绕制度环境、委托代理、政治联系、高管行为等方面挖掘政府规制背景下的上市公司高管业绩薪酬治理对盈余管理的影响机理和经济后果，并揭示这种作用链条对公司绩效的影响及其监管机制。.为了规避利益损失，随着薪酬差距的扩大，高管实施盈余管理程度越高；企业进行盈余管理存在业绩门槛效应，且在进行盈余管理时，企业对两类盈余管理的操作表现出替代性。由负向外部薪酬差距引起的盈余管理对公司业绩会产生显著的负向影响，这有损于公司未来业绩，这种影响在机会主义型盈余管理企业中程度更深，而在信息驱动型盈余管理中得以缓解。产品市场竞争增强了外部薪酬差距对盈余管理的效应；公司战略调整在一定程度上抑制了这种作用。高管获取私有收益时，偏好使用应计盈余管理，但在过度自信情景下，高管转而使用成本更高的真实盈余管理操纵私有收益。外部监管能有效抑制高管过度自信利用盈余管理操纵私有收益的不利影响。.企业的外部薪酬契约环境与应计盈余管理负相关，和真实盈余管理正相关；内部薪酬契约环境与应计盈余管理负相关，对真实盈余管理无影响。市场扭曲可以对盈余管理影响资本要素配置的效应产生一定的中介作用。2014年限薪令政策下政企合谋行为对高管薪酬的影响效果都强于2009年限薪令政策作用效果，政企合谋行为可以有效提高公司高管的隐性薪酬和显性薪酬。在盈余管理的调节作用下，2014年限薪令实施后央企的政企合谋现象对高管薪酬有非常显著抑制作用，政企合谋对地方企业内部薪酬差距有显著正向作用。.研究将为投资者提供指导，为监管者和政策制定者完善资本市场相关制度提供决策支持和科学依据，为国企深化改革背景下推动薪酬政策规制效应评估、内外部契约环境和高管薪酬激励约束机制优化、公司业绩管理和内部治理实践具有基础性意义和理论应用价值。