企业间合同治理和关系治理的选择及效应——基于中国情境的研究

Opportunism constitutes a huge barrier to interfirm cooperation.In China, where legal enforcement is rather weak and moral degradation has been aggravating, interfirm opportunism is very rampant and damaging. In order to realize the expected operational and strategic benefits, opportunism must be controlled below a reasonable level. Deterring opportunism necessitates governance. Governance has thus far been studied in two areas: the choice and effects of governance forms. In the last three or four decades, contractual and relational governance has received a lot of attention from academicians. But till now, there still exist many research gaps. The major reason might lie in ignorance or negligence of the role of institutional contexts, the dual functions of contracts, the multidimensional characteristics of opportunism, and the complexity of the relationship between relational governance and opportunism. To partially fill the gaps, we will adopt a contingent and disaggregated approach.We will not only induce four instutional variables and explore their moderating roles, but also decompose some key constructs and analyze the relationship between the focal dimensions of different constructs. In this project, we will explore the impact of institutional contexts on the choice of relational governance and contractual governance. What’s more, we’ll analyze the individual, compartative, and joint effects of relational and contractual governance on strong and weak form opportunisms. Besides, the moderating role of institutional context on these effects will also be studied. The theoretical contributions lie in the following two aspects. For one thing, we specifiy the role of instutional contexts, thus extending the boundary of theoretical findings. For another, we explore the relationships between the corresponding dimensions of different variables to dissect the interplaying relationships. The practical implication is that the research conclusions might provide several guidelines for the utilization of relational and contractual governance.

机会主义制约着企业间合作。在法治相对薄弱、出现道德滑坡的中国，这一问题尤为严重。因此，抑制机会主义是促进企业间合作进而实现预期利益的必然之举，这就要求企业采用有效的治理机制。合同治理和关系治理备受理论界关注，但该领域的研究仍存在诸多不足。其原因在于研究者未能充分认识制度情境的影响、合同的双重功能、机会主义的多维度特征以及关系治理和机会主义的关系复杂性。本项目拟采用权变的、解构的观点，引入四个反映中国情境的制度变量，并且将一些关键构念进行细分，不仅探究制度情境对人们选择合同治理和关系治理的影响，还要分析关系治理和合同治理对两类机会主义的单独效应、相对效应和联合效应以及制度情境对上述效应的影响。理论意义有二：一是，明确检验制度情境的作用，以拓展理论的应用边界；二是，研究不同变量的相应维度之间的关系，以细致梳理变量间作用机理。实践意义在于，相关结论有助于企业更合理地使用关系治理和合同治理机制。

机会主义制约着企业间合作。在法治相对薄弱、出现道德滑坡的中国，这一问题尤为严重。因此，抑制机会主义是促进企业间合作进而实现预期利益的必然之举，这就要求企业采用有效的治理机制。本项目着重关注制度情境和交易情境的对合同和关系治理的选择和效应的影响。运用交易成本理论、关系交换理论、资源依赖理论和制度理论等主流理论，采用313份针对采购经理的调研问卷数据以及中国上市公司数据，主要完成了三大类型的研究。其一，探讨“特殊主义文化”、“感知到的道德滑坡水平”以及由“反腐倡廉”所致的制度变迁等制度情境变量对合同治理和关系治理的选择及效应的影响；其二，用元分析方法探讨环境不确定性和行为不确定性对合同和关系的机会主义抑制效应的影响；其三，梳理了国外关于合同治理研究的前沿领域并对未来的研究进行了展望。主要结论如下。其一，合同治理更多地被用来处理由交易专用性投资产生的“保障”难题，而关系治理则更多地被用于应对由伙伴行为不确定性引起的“绩效评估”难题，并且特殊主义文化发挥了显著的调节作用。其二，过去的投射通过增加未来的投射从而抑制机会主义行为，而感知到的道德滑坡在第一阶段负向调节过去的投射对机会主义行为的间接影响。其三，反腐倡廉显著减弱了企业的关系导向战略，这一影响受到市场化程度和企业规模等因素的调节。其四，随着行为不确定性水平的提高，合同治理和关系治理对机会主义的抑制作用都会增强；随着环境不确定性水平的提高，关系治理对机会主义的抑制作用会增强但合同治理的作用效应无显著变化。其五，合同治理研究领域的国外新进展值得国内关注。近年来国外学者引入社会学和心理学等领域的新视角，并采用元分析法和试验法等新方法，取得了不少新的研究进展。本项目明确检验了制度情境和交易情境的作用，拓展了理论的应用边界。相关结论有助于企业更合理地使用关系治理和合同治理机制。