金字塔结构下母子公司“双向治理”形成机理与协同效应研究

The ultimate owner's one-way governance view, which is the main stream in current pyramid structure research, not only leads to the inconsistent conclusions of ultimate owner's controlling behaviors, such as tunneling or propping, but also ignoring some meaningful aspects in the practice of pyramid structure governance. Based on the perspective of parent-subsidiary company's "two-way" governance, this program introduces the interactive between ultimate owner and his subsidiary into framework to find out its governance effect on pyramid structure construction, which might promote pyramid structure research to the two-way governance view of ultimate owner and his subsidiary. First, this program will execute the theoretical explanation of the perspective of parent-subsidiary company's "two-way" governance, which focuses on subsidiary's autonomy and its interaction with ultimate owner, and exploit the different role of ultimate owner and his subsidiary in this interaction. Second, based on the perspective of parent-subsidiary company's "two-way" governance, this program will study the formation mechanisms of the layout of listed firms' pyramid structure. Specifically, the potential bargaining process between ultimate owner and his subsidiary, which might be affected by ultimate owner' explicit control, implicit control or the balancing of subsidiary's autonomy, could determine the layout of listed firms' pyramid structure. Third, this program will also further distinguish the changes of listed firms' layout in pyramid structure and testify their governance effects, which stem from different formation mechanisms, such as the insider control dominated by ultimate owner, subsidiary's autonomy or the synergistic effect.

金字塔结构治理研究中存在的实际控制人单边治理观，不仅导致了实际控制人控制行为的研究分歧（掏空或者支持），而且难以全面反映金字塔结构治理的实践。本项目引入母子公司“双向治理”研究视角，将实际控制人与子公司的互动纳入研究框架，探析母子公司双向治理的形成机理与协同效应，期望实现该领域研究向实际控制人与子公司的双边治理观演进。首先，进行母子公司“双向治理”研究视角的理论解构，关注子公司的自主性以及与实际控制人的互动过程，并明确实际控制人与子公司在互动过程中的地位和角色。继而，探析金字塔结构下母子公司“双向治理”形成机理，即实际控制人与上市子公司的讨价还价（实际控制人的显性控制、隐性控制、子公司自主性的制衡以及协同治理）对金字塔结构布局的影响。最后，甄别源自不同形成机理的金字塔结构布局变化，即实际控制人主导的内部人控制、子公司自主性以及协同治理，并验证其差异化治理效应。

母子公司单边治理忽视了子公司能动性，难以全面反映母子公司治理实践。本项目将母公司与子公司的互动纳入研究框架，系统探究了母子公司“双向治理”的形成机理、作用过程及治理效应。研究结论如下：第一，将委托代理理论、资源依赖理论和参照点契约理论引入母子公司互动过程，发现了母子公司“双向治理”的形成机理，构建了母子公司“双向治理”的理论框架；第二，母公司“自上而下”的控制、子公司 “自下而上”的制衡以及母子公司的协同治理共同构成了母子公司“双向治理”的作用过程。第三，母子公司“双向治理”对子公司绩效、战略等具有积极治理效应。综上所述，本项目将母子公司单边治理观拓展到双边治理观，厘清了金字塔结构下母子公司互动的作用机理，并揭示了母子公司“双向治理”的机制和治理效应，为公司治理领域母子公司关系研究提供了新的理论视角，也为作为母公司的集团公司和作为子公司的上市公司提高治理质量提供了理论指导和实践借鉴。