成员主导型金融组织治理研究

Member-driven financial institutions have been paid much attentions as for their cost advantage and specific governance. It is the dominant feature for these institutions that their members play more actors such as the owner, the managers and the customer. This study aims to explore the conflicts between the agents and the conditions for them achieving the incentive compatibility in member-driven financial institutions, and using Chinese cases and data to test the compatibility and the validity of their governanc structure and governance memanisms. To do so, the study proposes an analytic framework, which attempts to match the governance issues with the governance structure and the governance mechanisms. Under this framework, the study constructs theoretical models to explore the conditions for the agents achieving the incentive compatibility, furthermore uses the cases to generalize the specific governance issues, compares different member-driven financial institutions in terms of the governnance structure and the governance memechanisms and examines the compatibility of these governance arrangement, lastly applies the data and econometric models to test the validity of their governance mechanisms. This study besed on the perspective of the multi-targets and the multi-relationships helps to make the organization governance theory perfect, as the empirical analysis in this study cloud provide instructions and references for improving the governance in the member-driven financial institutions and the relevant regulation and supervision.

成员主导型金融组织因其成本优势与治理制度而备受关注。此类组织的显著特征是成员既是所有者和管理者，同时又是客户。本项目旨在揭示此类组织内部不同主体之间的利益冲突以及他们实现激励相容的条件，并利用案例与数据考察其治理制度的匹配性与有效性。为此，本项目提出一个考察成员主导型金融组织治理的分析框架，试图将治理问题与治理结构、治理机制"对应"起来，由此来把握此类组织的治理特殊性。在该框架下，首先构建理论模型以揭示实现组织不同主体实现激励相容的条件，然后采用案例概括、比较成员主导型金融组织治理问题的具体表现形式、治理结构及机制的特点，并考察其治理结构及机制的匹配性，最后利用实地调研数据与计量模型检验治理机制的有效性。本项目从多目标与多关系角度对内部利益主体相互关系所展开的委托代理分析,有助于进一步完善组织治理理论；同时，对于改进成员主导型金融组织的治理制度以及加强监管具有理论指导与经验支持价值。

本研究试图从治理这个角度打开成员主导型金融组织这个“黑匣子”。在一个成员主导型金融组织治理的分析框架下，本研究构建理论模型以揭示实现组织不同主体激励相容的条件，并通过案例和数据实证考察此类组织治理制度安排的主要内容与特点及其对治理问题的匹配性和有效性。该研究有两个特点：一是注意到了此类组织的治理特殊性并将其贯彻到整个研究当中；二是重视并采用匹配等方法“处理”此类组织实证研究所固有的异质性问题。主要研究发现有：（1）成员主导型金融组织最主要的治理问题是净储蓄者-净贷款者利益冲突。（2）成员主导型金融组织的产权、决策及分配制度应与风险管理机制统一起来，避免风险与权利、收益的错配。（3）成员主导型金融组织的治理制度安排对其双重目标具有异质性的作用机理。本研究不仅在成员主导型金融组织治理的分析框架、理论分析及实证方法创新方面具有重要学术价值，而且提出的保护储蓄者利益和加强金融监管等政策建议更触及问题之本质、更具有可行性。