关联股东的治理角色研究

In enterprises, some non-controlling large shareholders establish different kinds of specific relationship with the controlling shareholders by many forms of contracts. These non-controlling large shareholders, also called as the relational shareholders of the controlling shareholders, are related by property right, family, management and concerted actions. In this project, using agency and contract theory, we make a breakthrough in the traditional limitation of dichotomy method (the relationship between controlling shareholders and non-controlling shareholders).In the framework of ownership structure, we set up our research using a trichotomy method(the relationship among controlling shareholders, controlling shareholders' relational shareholders and other non-retional shareholders)to construct dynamic models on the transformation of relational shareholders' role in corporate governance. We examine the relational shareholders' role in corporate governance from the following three aspects: the self-interest behavior and inside trading of relational shareholders, the involvement of relational shareholders in the controlling shareholders' actions of tunneling and obtaining private benefits of control, the relational shareholders' influence on the efficiency of incentives and supervisions to managers. A further study on different types of relational shareholders' role in corporate governance, according to the property, characteristics and degree of the agency problem in the state holding enterprise, family business and entrepreneurial firm, provides new theories and evidences on corporate governance, ownership structure and corporate financial policy. We develop the framework of trichotomy method in ownership structure researches and finally put forward suggestions on the regulatory policy of relational shareholders' behavior.

在企业中，一些非控制性大股东通过多种形式的契约，与控股股东之间建立起了各种特定性质的正式联系，这些股东可称之为控股股东的关联股东，主要包括产权关联、亲缘关联、任职关联和一致行动等四种类型。本项目运用代理理论和契约理论,突破现有股权结构研究的"两分法"（控股股东与中小股东)的局限性,在股权结构研究"三分法"(控股股东、控股股东的关联股东和非关联中小股东)的框架下,构建关联股东治理角色转换的动态模型。从关联股东的自利行为及内幕交易、关联股东与控股股东控制权私利及掏空行为的关系、关联股东对管理层激励与监督效率的影响三个维度检验关联股东的治理角色。针对国有控股企业、家族企业和创业型企业代理问题性质、特征和程度，进一步分别研究不同类型关联股东的治理角色，为公司治理、股权结构和公司财务政策的研究提供新的理论与证据,确立股权结构研究"三分法"框架的理论价值，最后提出对关联股东行为的监管政策建议。

本项目的主要研究内容是我国上上市公司关联股东的治理角色。关联股东包括控股股东的关联方和一致行动人。本项目运用代理理论和契约理论，通过建立和完善“中国上市公司股东关系数据库（2003-2014）”，借助对关联股东权力超额配置的分析，从关联股东影响企业价值可能的途径入手，用三个维度深入研究关联股东的治理角色。具体包括：从理论上深入了分析关联股东的治理角色,探究了在企业中关联股东对控股股东的监督角色和关联股东与控股股东结盟角色的内涵及其经济后果；深入分析了关联股东的超额权力配置，包括刻画并描述了关联股东的超额权力配置的情况，分析了关联股东的超额权力配置对关联股东治理角色形成、转换及其经济后果的影响；从三个维度（关联股东的自利行为及内幕交易、关联股东与控股股东控制权私利及掏空行为的关系、关联股东对管理层激励与监督效率的影响）研究了关联股东在公司治理中扮演的角色；由于关联股东存在不同的治理角色及严重的经济后果，本项目还具体针对关联股东持股、关联股东股权交易和信息披露等问题提出了一些监管政策建议。