城乡建设用地指标交易规则及定价机制设计

Aiming at the current status of the pricing mechanism implement of the quota of urban and rural construction land and the existing problems in it, it is studied how to optimize the pricing mechanism, trading rules and profit-sharing arrangement, in order to improve the efficiency of allocation and utilization of scarce land resources. We firstly clearly indicates that the intrinsic value of the quota of construction land is determined the value added due to its ability of space conversion. We depict the essential attribute of determining the intrinsic value of the quota of construction land, and find out the pricing benchmark for the quota of construction land. Then, considering 12 different combinations of the using rules, deducting rules for the purchase fee pricing and auction rules of the quota, we develop complementary goods sequential auction models to study the auction mechanism for the quota of construction land under centralized supply mode. Then, developing searching matching models between the suppliers and the demanders of the quota of construction land, we analyze the pricing efficiency of the quota of construction land under decentralized supply mode, and investigate the effect of three kinds of government intervention on the pricing efficiency in order to select the optimal intervention mode. Finally, developing two-stage dynamic game models between government and farmers, we study the profit sharing arrangement of the quota. We strive to set up a system for government deciding the pricing, trading and profit sharing rules of the quota of construction land, in order to expanding the research contains of auction theory, transaction and pricing of quota of construction land, as well as provide enforceable suggestions for improving the pricing mechanism of the quota of construction land.

本项目针对现行城乡建设用地指标定价机制实施的现状及存在的问题，研究如何通过优化建设用地指标的定价机制、交易规则和收益分配，提高稀缺土地资源的配置效率。项目首先明确了用地指标的内在价值由其空间转换功能所带来价值增值决定，并刻画出建设用地指标内在价值决定的本质属性，确定出建设用地指标定价基准。综合考虑建设用地指标落地规则、价款抵扣规则和拍卖规则的12种不同组合，构建互补品序贯拍卖模型，研究集中供给模式下的建设用地指标拍卖机制。构建建设用地指标供需双方搜寻匹配模型，分析分散供给模式下的建设用地指标定价效率，探讨政府3种干预模式对定价效率的影响，并选出最优干预模式。构建政府与农户的两期动态博弈模型，研究建设用地指标收益分配机制。本项目力争构建起建设用地指标定价、交易和收益分配的政府决策体系，拓展拍卖理论、建设用地指标交易及定价等领域的研究范畴，为建设用地指标定价机制的改进提供具有可操作的对策建议。

为确保社会、经济和环境的可持续发展，中央政府实施了建设用地指标分配机制，严格控制每年分配给地方政府的建设用地指标总量。但随着我国经济的飞速发展和城市化进程不断加快，建设用地需求数量急剧增加，导致建设用地指标供应不足。同时，随着城市化的快速发展，农村劳动力大量涌入城市，导致农村宅基地闲置，降低了土地利用效率。为了解决以上问题，重庆市率先成立农村土地交易所，开展建设用地指标交易试验。尽管该试验在一定程度上缓解了我国地方面临的困境，但却未能达到预期。在建设用地指标交易实践中，指标价格是依据宅基地复垦成本而确定，没有反映出建设用地指标的内在价值，无法真正激励农民复垦闲置宅基地。另一方面，获得指标的开发商并不一定能成功拍得建设用地，导致指标使用率偏低，更不利于土地资源的高效配置。因此，亟需在对我国建设用地指标交易现状进行梳理的基础上，有针对性的提出改进建设用地指标定价效率的对策建议及实施办法，推进建设用地指标交易市场发展。.本项目主要是基于当前建设用地指标由政府职能部门集中进行统一拍卖的基础上，综合考虑建设用地指标落地概率（即持有建设用地指标的开发商在下一阶段成功获得建设用地的概率）和建设用地指标价款抵扣规则（即建设用地指标获取价款是否可以抵扣土地款）的不同组合基础上，设计出最优的建设用地指标定价规则，完善建设用地指标交易市场，为促进城乡统一的建设用地市场建立，推动新型城镇化和新农村建设，提供新思路和新方法。研究发现，可以采取适当提高土地闲置费用，或通过提高参与拍卖的竞标人资质审核标准来降低竞标人数，进而提高指标的价格；同时，可以适当给予开发商一定土地价格减免，以提高指标和土地竞标价格，并刺激农民更加积极地自愿退出闲置宅基地，盘活农民存量农村土地，优化当前中国土地空间配置现状，促进农村土地资源的集约高效和持续利用。此外，还可以采用序贯二价拍卖，来提高建设用地指标和土地的利用效率。