对国有企业高杠杆的控制权网络解析 - 发生机制与控制路径

The unique debt structure of Chinese economy is the over-indebtedness of its listed SOEs. The extent to which this debt excessiveness can be effectively caped and handled will decide if China can successfully cope with the domestic and international economic uncertainty resulted from the unprecedented reversal of globalization. Evident technically, all deleverage means work through either debt decrease or equity increase. We aim in this project to clarify the driving forces behind the high leverage of listed SOEs and offer insights for highly efficient execution of the mixed ownership reforms. To achieve this goal, we first observe from a control network perspective that the high leverage is a necessary result of the wedding between the gigantic state sector and the market economy. Under the veil of control network, governmental officials or the managers appointed by these officials allocate financial resource to maximize their chance for promotion instead of profit, which causes the debt of listed SOEs in the networks rises along with the plummeting of these firms’ valuation; Next, we test the validity of this perspective by examining the relationship between the leverage of listed SOEs and the severity of the agent problem as indicated by the informational and structural characteristics of these networks; Lastly, we explore which internal and external governance factors impose significant counterchecking effects on the aforementioned leverage elevation mechanism. To sum up, we contribute to the selection and triage of SOE candidates for mixed ownership reform by demarcating SOEs by networks in which they operate, developing metrics to measure the severity of such networks in elevating leverage, and finding the significant governance mechanisms counterchecking the leverage elevation effect.

我国总体债务的独特性是上市国企杠杆过高。有效控制和降低国企杠杆将决定中国经济能否平稳应对严重的全球化逆转造成的国内和国际经济的巨大不确定性。降杠杆归根结底只有降低债务或提升权益两条途径。本研究力图明确国企高杠杆的驱动机制，为混合所有制改革在这两条路径上的优化提供建议。为达到这一目的，我们首先从控制权网络这一角度说明国企高杠杆是我国独有的巨大国有经济和市场手段结合后的反应。国企和地方政府的非市场性激励通过控制权网络协同共生使得金融资源的非市场化配置以市场形式进行，导致控制权网络内上市国企债务增加的同时估值降低；然后，我们通过控制权网络信息和结构特征所揭示的问题严重程度来观察国企杠杆的变化从而实证这一视角的可靠性；最后，我们检测对这种网络杠杆效应有抑制作用的内外治理因素。把国企按照网络划分、衡量各网络问题的严重程度、以及确定有效的治理因子都可以帮助混合所有制改革做到有的放矢且区分轻重缓急。

本项目的终极目标是通过考察控制权网络及其结构特征对国企杠杆率的影响，为国有企业提供两条可供选择的降低杠杆率的路径即延缓债务增长和提升权益价值，并对路径的具体实施提供建议。我国总体债务的独特性是上市国企杠杆过高。有效控制和降低国企杠杆将决定中国经济能否平稳应对严重的全球化逆转造成的国内和国际经济的巨大不确定性。降杠杆归根结底只有降低债务或提升权益两条途径。本研究力图明确国企高杠杆的驱动机制，为混合所有制改革在这两条路径上的优化提供建议。为达到这一目的，我们首先从控制权网络这一角度说明国企高杠杆是我国独有的巨大国有经济和市场手段结合后的反应。国企和地方政府的非市场性激励或者晋升竞争通过控制权网络得以实现，使得金融资源的非市场化配置以市场形式进行，导致控制权网络内上市国企债务增加的同时估值降低。然后，我们通过控制权网络信息和结构特征所揭示的问题严重程度来观察国企杠杆的变化从而实证这一视角的可靠性。最后，我们检测对这种网络杠杆效应有抑制作用的内外治理因素。把国企按照网络划分、衡量各网络问题的严重程度、以及确定有效的治理因子都可以帮助混合所有制改革做到有的放矢且区分轻重缓急。负债减少和估值提高是去杠杆化的最终途径，这已成为中国经济议程中最重要的事项之一。改善企业治理尤其重要，因为它不仅是初级市场股权融资可持续性的基础，这一点在近年来IPO的空前快速步伐中得到了突出体现，而且也是新阶段改革（如支持现有国有企业股权价值的私营公共合作伙伴关系，提高国企央企的估值水平）的可行性的基础。我们的观点和结果表明，如果不对政府官员和相关管理人员的晋升标准做出根本改变，针对上市国有企业的去杠杆化努力可能无法实现。至少应该做到相关治理机构，比如证监会，法院等对地方政府的决定确实可以得到执行。