终极控制权制衡与国有企业创新效率研究

In light of the mixed ownership reform in China, this project attempts to identify the ultimate controller of the top ten shareholders in state-owned enterprises, then define the controlling right of these ultimate controllers, and finally examine the impact of check-and-balance ultimate controlling right on innovation efficiency in state-owned enterprises. Specifically, the task of this project is threefold: first, to calculate both the controlling right proportion of different ultimate controller and the degree of check-and-balance on substantial owner imposed by different ultimate controller (i.e. other stated-owned shareholders and non-stated-owned shareholders); second, to set up theoretical framework and introduce empirical approach to test the association between check-and-balance ultimate controlling structure and innovation efficiency in state-owned enterprises; third, to extend to exploring the mechanism through which check-and-balance ultimate controlling structure affects innovation efficiency in state-owned enterprises, and further to the influence of the specific forms of mixed ownership reform on innovation efficiency. On the basis of the fact that China is confronted with an urgent need to upgrade its industrial structure and innovation has been incorporated into the national strategy due to its importance for raising the productive forces, this project intends to reveal the effectiveness of the mixed ownership reform in state-owned enterprises from the perspective of innovation efficiency. Through foregoing analysis, this project aims to not only deepen the theoretical understanding of the ownership reform in state-owned enterprises, but also to provide practical suggestions for further reform in the mixed ownership in state-owned enterprises.

本项目通过追溯国有企业各类股东的终极控制人，清晰地界定混合所有制下的各类控制主体的控制权，并以此为基础，深入研究不同性质的终极控制权制衡对国有企业创新效率的影响。具体分以下三步：（1）测算国有企业不同性质股东的控制权比例和终极控制权制衡度，既要测算非国有性质股东对终极国有股东的制衡度，也要测算其他类型的国有性质股东对终极国有股东的制衡度；（2）对终极控制权制衡与国有企业创新效率之间的关系进行全面系统的理论分析和实证检验；（3）进一步拓展检验终极控制权制衡对创新效率影响的传导路径和混合所有制改革的各种具体方式对创新效率的作用。本研究立足于中国正处于产业结构升级和创新已上升到国家战略层面的现实情境，以创新效率作为主要观察点，全面检验当前已在国有企业中推行的混合所有制改革的成效，既从理论上提高对当前国有企业产权改革的认识，又从实践上为国有企业进一步的混合所有制改革提供更具有可操作性的政策建议。

结合混合所有制改革的政策逻辑，本项目基于“股权的控制权”和“董事会的控制权”，全面检验了非实际控制人作为市场化力量的代表，能否以及如何按照市场化的逻辑在国有企业中发挥“资源支持”效应和“权力监督”效应，以实现国有企业创新效率的提升。研究发现：（1）无论是董事会还是股东大会，投票权赋予非实际控制人的“发声”能力都并非停留于表面，事实上都能帮助非实际控制人真正的参与企业的经营管理活动并施加实质性影响力。一方面，非实际控制人不仅能监督和约束实际控制人不做“坏事”（即“权力监督”），另一方面，非实际控制人还能够为国有企业提供知识、技术、管理理念等多方面的资源支持，帮助其“做的更好”（即“资源支持”）。最终，提高国有企业的创新产出、并购效率、资源配置效率以及其高管薪酬与创新业绩（预期）敏感性。（2）非实际控制人的董事会权力还会受到自身性质和国有企业实际控制人性质的影响。当非实际控制人为国有性质或者国有企业为地方政府控制时，非实际控制人的治理效果更好。此外，国企混合所有制改革政策的正式推出为非实际控制人在属于战略性行业的国有企业中发挥董事会权力的治理效应提供了助力。（3）进一步补充检验了控制权制衡对创新效率影响的传导路径，发现控制权制衡可以提升国有企业高管激励的市场化水平，降低国有实际控制人和管理层的非效率行为，两者最终都会对国有企业创新项目的成功转化产生积极影响。以上研究结论表明，在稳步推进混合所有制改革的过程中，国有企业并不能仅停留于资本层面引入非实际控制人，关键还在于如何赋予非实际控制人董事会权力来保障其“话语权”，充分发挥其治理效应。本项目为市场化力量能否以及如何有效制衡政府股东行为，促进国有企业创新效率的提升提供了有效的经验证据。