多维动态辖区竞争及税收协调可行性研究

With the deepening process of economic globalization and regional economic integration, the mobility of productive factors is increasing rapidly, which increases the interactions and interdependence of jurisdictions' economic policies and the intensity of inter-jurisdictional competition for scarce resources. The competing jurisdictions can be in an advantageous position in the global competition and promote their economic development only if they can adjust their fiscal policies in time and effectively. The advantage of dynamic competition study is to reveal how policy variables evolve over time, which is not possible for the traditional literature using static models. This project is to investigate dynamic inter-jurisdictional competition within (stochastic) differential game framework under different economic backgrounds and to analyze the optimal policy mix for the competing jurisdictions..On the other hand, empirical study shows that inter-jurisdictional competition is multi-dimensional (including tax and non-tax competition). When jurisdictions are assumed to compete by tax and non-tax instruments, tax coordination has a carry-over effect on other non-tax instruments. This carry-over effect is mostly neglected in the existing literature. In this project, we will reconsider the impacts of tax coordination on jurisdictions’ welfare and the conditions under which that tax coordination can be Pareto-improving using cooperative and non-cooperative game-theoretical approaches. Our results will provide theoretical basis and reference for inter-jurisdictional tax cooperation.

随着经济全球化以及区域经济一体化进程的不断加深，生产要素的流动性显著增加，辖区间经济政策的相互影响和依赖程度不断提高，对稀缺资源的竞争愈演愈烈。辖区政府只有及时有效地调整其财政政策，才能在竞争中赢得有利局面，进而促进该地区的经济发展。动态竞争研究的优势在于可以揭示政策变量随时间的动态深化过程，而这一点是传统文献中所采用的静态模型无法实现的。本项目将利用（随机）微分博弈方法来研究在不同的经济背景下辖区间的动态竞争问题，从而给出辖区在动态竞争中的最优政策组合。. 另外，实证研究表明，辖区间的竞争是多维的（包括税收和非税收竞争）。在多维辖区竞争假设下，税收协调会对其他非税收政策工具产生传导效应，而现有税收协调文献忽略了这一点。本项目将利用合作博弈和非合作博弈方法重新研究税收协调政策对辖区社会福利的影响以及税收协调是帕累托改进的条件，进而为辖区税收合作提供理论依据和参考。

本课题将静态税收竞争理论扩展为动态竞争理论，将一维辖区博弈推广为多维辖区博弈。这不仅从理论上丰富了财政竞争理论，而且从新的角度研究了财政竞争的社会福利含义；深入探究了完全税收合作和局部税收合作对于各辖区福利的效应。本项目的研究，不仅对政府制定辖区税收和财政支出政策具有理论指导意义，而且为各辖区是否应该实施以及如何实施税收合作政策提供理论参考。另外，本项目考虑在场外期权交易过程中面临交易对手的违约风险的期权定价，由此可以帮助我们更有效地管理投资组合。