基于无缺陷退货的零售商预售策略和供应链协调问题研究

Facing with an unpredictable changing market, demand from consumers becomes more vulnerable to uncertain factors. In order to avoid and reduce the demand risk, more firms adopt the advance selling strategy for locking part of the demand in advance. However, due to the fact that consumers may not be able to fully experience products in the advance selling period, advance selling could eventually lead to the increase of false faliure returns. Therefore，managers face a challenge in decision making on how to tradeoff both the advantages and disadvantages of advance selling. Most of the existing research focuses on the advace selling strategy without considering false failure returns. To close the gap, this project studies both advance selling and ordering strategies of retailers with false failure returne. Further, we analyze supply chain efficiency, and designs contratcts to coordinate supply chain. Firstly, by introducing several modes of advance selling, this project can provide an in-depth study on the advance selling problem of a decentralized supply chain. We will study the pricing and quota policy in the advance selling period and the ordering policy in the normal selling period, discuss the effects of advance selling modes and consumers’ returns on optimal strategies of a single retailer. Secondly, by indroducing both quantitative competition and price competition, we will study the equilibrium strategies of competitive retailers and discuss the impact of different competition scenarios on the retailers’ optimal strategies. Thirdly, under a downside risk criterion, we will investigate how risk aversion affects the retailers strategies. Finally, we will study the effects of both advance selling and false failure returns on both supply chain efficiency and design contracts to coordinate the decentralized supply chain. By using stochastc programming, dynamic programming and game theory, we will establish reasonable mathematical models. Meanwhile, we will validate and verify the models by numerical analysis. This study will improve the existing knowledge of the advance selling problem, and provide theoretical foundations for managers’ decision making.

面对瞬息万变的市场，需求变得更容易受到不确定因素的影响。越来越多的企业采用预售方式规避需求风险。然而，由于消费者无法充分体验产品，预售可能导致无缺陷退货的增加。如何权衡预售的利弊是决策者面临的难题。为此本项目基于无缺陷退货，研究零售商的预售和订购策略以及供应链的效率分析和协调契约设计。首先，项目引入三种预售方式，研究单一零售商的预售定价、配额和订购策略，探讨预售方式和退货对零售商决策的影响；其次，引入两种竞争方式，研究竞争性零售商的均衡预售和订购策略，探讨竞争和竞争方式对零售商决策的影响；再次，利用下方损失风险测度刻画风险厌恶行为，分析风险厌恶程度对零售商策略的影响；最后，研究预售和退货对供应链绩效的影响并在供应链协调下进行契约设计。利用随机规划、动态规划和博弈论等理论工具，合理建立模型，并通过数值算例验证模型。本研究将完善现有预售的理论研究，为供应链决策者有效制定预售策略提供理论依据。

预售已成为网络零售中的重要营销手段并被广泛使用，不允许退货是预售的基本特征。然而现实中，电商巨头亚马逊和京东对预售采用了完全相反的退货策略：高退货成本且提供退货 vs. 低退货成本但不提供退货。为解释上述企业实践差异，本项目系统研究零售商的预售策略、退货策略、以及消费者及决策者行为偏好对运营策略的影响。在项目执行的四年期内，我们根据项目的立项目的和预期目标开展研究工作，并对该问题的研究取得了几方面的成果。我们发现除了产品收益率及消费者产品估值以外，消费者市场结构对是否预售，是否扩大预售范围、是否提供退货起到了决定性因素。这一被现有研究忽略的因素成为解释现实实践差异的核心，由此我们也成功的解释了两大电商巨头在预售决策中的策略差异并证实他们的策略都是最优策略。另外，我们清晰刻画了行为偏好对消费者和零售商决策的影响，发现消费者和零售商的损失厌恶行为和锚定效应对零售商运营策略和消费者购买决策产生巨大的影响。由于零售商决策者会影响运营经理的参考依赖效果，而运营经理所使用的营销和经营策略也会同时影响消费者的购买预期，为此进一步了解需求的内生性和消费者行为是非常重要且有意义的。另外，我们也研究了相应的供应链契约设计、供应商决策及相关物流问题优化等问题。项目的成果对供应链决策者管理实践有启发意义，也为进一步深入研究运营管理和营销管理的界面问题提供了一定的理论基础。