控股股东股权质押期间的机会主义行为研究：表现形式、作用途径及其治理机制

The Equity Pledge of Controlling Shareholders has become a popular leverage behavior in China's capital market. It looks like the equity pledge is the controlling shareholders' own financial behavior and would not impact the corporate operation and its value. However, in reality the equity pledge commonly induces the market timing, tunneling, earnings management, overinvestment and other opportunistic behavior of the controlling shareholder, resulting in bad economic consequences. Using the Game Theory and empirical method comprehensively, the research will make an analysis on the reality, focusing on three questions. The first one is that what opportunistic behavior will be induced by the equity pledge of controlling shareholder. The second one is that which are the functional approaches of that opportunistic behavior during the equity pledge of controlling shareholder. The last one is that what internal and external government mechanism will limit the opportunistic behavior during the equity pledge of controlling shareholder. The research goals of the above three questions are seeking for the key variables used to quickly identify the opportunistic behavior, the key approach for the opportunistic behavior to function and the key government mechanism restraining the opportunistic behavior. It will theoretically enlarge the research perspectives on the agency problem of controlling shareholder, and the research outcome will offer theoretical basis and experiential support for rationally widening the financing sources of controlling shareholders, strengthening the minority investor protection and promoting the healthy development of capital market.

控股股东股权质押已成为我国资本市场日渐普遍的杠杆行为。表面上看，股权质押属于控股股东自身的财务行为，并不会影响公司经营及其价值。但现实中，股权质押经常会诱发控股股东市场择时、掏空行为、盈余管理、过度投资等系列机会主义行为，从而带来不良的经济后果。本项目将综合采用博弈理论和实证研究方法，对这一现实进行分析。着重研究三个问题：（1）控股股东股权质押可能会诱发哪些机会主义行为？（2）控股股东股权质押期间机会主义行为发生的作用途径有哪些？（3）有哪些内外部治理机制能够对控股股东股权质押期间的机会主义行为产生制约？三个问题的研究目标分别是：探寻快速识别机会主义行为的关键变量、探寻机会主义行为得以实施的关键途径、探寻遏制机会主义行为的关键治理机制。本项目将在理论上拓宽控股股东代理问题的研究视角，研究成果将为合理拓宽控股股东融资渠道、强化中小投资者利益保护、促进资本市场健康发展提供理论依据和经验支持。

近年来，控股股东股权质押因其独特的优势已成为我国资本市场上快速有效的融资渠道。然而，股权质押在带来便利的同时，由此引发的问题也逐渐突出。现实中，股权质押经常会诱发控股股东市场择时、掏空行为、盈余管理、过度投资等系列机会主义行为，从而带来不良的经济后果。本项目采用实证研究方法，对这一现实进行分析。着重研究三个问题：（1）控股股东股权质押可能会诱发哪些机会主义行为？（2）控股股东股权质押期对公司现金股利发放有何影响？（3）控股股东股权质押与企业过度投资之间有何关联？研究发现，控股股东股权质押率与现金股利支付水平之间为负相关关系，这一关系在民营企业中更加显著。但较高的外部审计质量可以提高上市公司现金股利支付水平，并有助于抑制控股股东股权质押和上市公司现金股利支付水平之间的负相关关系。此外，控股股东股权质押会加剧企业过度投资，且质押比例越大，过度投资程度越严重，其中控股股东代理成本起到了部分中介作用。不同产权性质下，控股股东股权质押对企业过度投资的影响有显著差异，具体表现为：非国有企业较国有企业而言，控股股东股权质押对控股股东代理成本和企业过度投资的影响更加显著。本项目在理论上拓宽控股股东代理问题的研究视角，研究成果为合理拓宽控股股东融资渠道、强化中小投资者利益保护、促进资本市场健康发展提供理论依据和经验支持。