基于动态联盟谈判机制的合作对策分配方案设计及其优化分析

In economy, fair and reasonable allocation among the players and its smooth implementation play a critical part to spur the cooperation of the players. In our project, on one hand, we design the allocations (or solutions) of the cooperative game by considering the dynamic coalitional formation procedure. On the other hand, the fairness for the solutions is analyzed, based on optimization theory approach. Precisely, first of all, the relationship between dynamic alliance stability and allocation scheme is studied, due to the characterization of the tight connection between the players’ preferences and the marginal contributions. To do that, the entrance rules and the negotiation strategies for the players are designed, yielding the allocation mechanism for the marginal contributions are obtained. Secondly, by revealing the coincidence between the solutions and the expected revenue under different coalitional formation orders, we characterize the solutions by proposing certain process axioms, and the procedure implementation for the solutions are designed. Thirdly, we establish the evaluation system for the solutions of cooperative games, by presenting a stream of basic standards of rationality, through considering the coalitional formation orders and the loss function with respect to the complaints for the individual players. Finally, we determine the optimal allocation based on optimization theory, by studying the so-called the minimal individual loss function. .This project not only innovatively puts forward the negotiation mechanism of dynamic alliance, providing theoretical basis for the design of allocation scheme, but also analyzes and characterizes the solutions of cooperative games by using optimization theory. In this sense, We unify the allocation scheme in the context of optimization theory system. The theoretical results could be used to reveal the rules of dynamic alignment of the participants. Also it is widely used in the field of economic management. Particularly, the theorems in this project play a significant role in analyzing and determining the cost allocation with respect to “one belt, one way” problems.

科学地设计合理的分配方案是促成参与者合作结盟的核心要素。本项目基于参与者动态联盟过程，构建谈判机制，设计分配方案，并利用优化理论与方法对其合理性展开以下研究工作。1)研究参与者价值取向与边际贡献的关系，设计参与者动态进入对策规则，构建谈判机制，探索谈判机制与联盟稳定性的关系，揭示动态联盟形成机理；2)研究动态联盟谈判机制下参与者期望收益与分配方案的一致性，利用公理化性质，结合谈判机制与分配方案的关系，完成分配方案的设计；3)基于动态联盟的谈判机制，以参与者不满意水平为指标，提出优化评价准则，构建分配方案的优化评价体系；4)以参与者期望损失函数最小为目标，利用优化理论，研究合作对策的最优分配方案。本项目创新性地提出动态联盟的谈判机制，为分配方案的设计提供理论依据，并将分配方案统一到优化理论体系中，揭示参与者动态结盟规律。项目成果可以用来设计“一带一路”成本分配方案，并分析该分配方案的合理性。

项目探讨了参与者动态联盟情形下合作对策分配方案的设计及其优化分析。项目主要结论如下：1)基于参与者动态联盟过程，分析了参与者价值取向与边际贡献的关系，研究了参与者动态联盟形成的内在规律，通过构建动态联盟谈判机制，设计了利他主义下的分配方案，即加权ENSC值；2)重新提出了抱怨机制，用来衡量参与者对分配方案的满意程度，进而通过求解所有参与者的不满意程度最低这一优化问题问题，确定利己行为和利他行为下最优分配方案；3)基于参与者偏好提出了合作博弈分配方案研究的字典序优化方法，研究了优化理论框架下合作博弈解的特征与公理化刻画，从优化理论框架下揭示了合作博弈收益分配的本质关系；4) 将动态联盟谈判机制的相关理论成果应用于水污染治理、最优排序等管理问题中，探索水污染治理、最优排序等管理问题中的动态联盟形成的内在原因与条件。项目的研究将合作对策分配方案设计及动态联盟谈判机制有机结合起来，并将分配方案统一到优化理论体系中，揭示参与者动态结盟规律，为动态联盟的形成提供理论依据。从2019年项目立项以来，项目负责人依据项目申请书进度安排，顺利完成了计划书中的各项研究工作，研究结果得到同行认可，部分成果在国际知名期刊上发表。具体地，项目负责人在国际重要的经济学和运筹学期刊中发表论文学术论文11篇，其中一作或通讯5篇，包括运筹决策类国际核心期刊Group Decision and Negotiation (JCR分区2区)，运筹管理类重要国际期刊Mathematical Methods of Operations Research，经济管理类期刊Economics Letters(JCR分区2区)、Theory and Decision等。以此为基础进行应用研究，将理论成果应用于水污染共同治理、供应链联合订货成本分摊以及排序等经济管理问题中，为决策者提供决策理论依据。项目的研究成果涵盖了项目计划的内容。