具有联盟结构合作对策收益分配的非合作机制设计研究

In cooperative game, each of players wants to maximize his gains during the allocation process, while they form the grand coalition according to the agreement. From this situation, the project aims to build the system of non-cooperative mechanism design including bidding, bargaining and negotiation, and to achieve a dynamic strategy of some fair and rational allocation schemes for cooperative game, from the design of these non-cooperation mechanisms, by using non-cooperative game theory and Nash equilibrium as a tool..We study the design of non-cooperative mechanism for the allocation scheme of cooperative game with coalitional structure in the project. We first adopt the structural analysis to get characteristics of feasible coalitions, construct the extensive form of the corresponding non-cooperative game, and design the coalitional bidding mechanism. Meanwhile, for a single-valued solution, we design the bidding mechanism or bargaining mechanism of the non-cooperative game, according to the properties of the value, such as consistency, associated consistency, and the potential function. For a convex solution set, we design the negotiation mechanism of the non-cooperative game, in terms of a linear transformation on vertex vectors of the solution set, which preserves the convexity of the set. By data simulation and theoretical analysis, the allocation scheme is finally derived from the design of non-cooperative mechanism, for cooperative game with coalition structure..Non-cooperative game theory and cooperative game theory is integrated through this research. A non-cooperative approach is provided to the research of allocation scheme for cooperative game. This research can enrich the methods and techniques on this study. It will improve the theoretical system in the field of cooperative game theory and the application of non-cooperative game theory..The theoretical results will be applied to study the problems of rescue mechanism in European sovereign debt crisis, NBA labor negotiations, and so on. It can provide a theoretical issue for these situations, such as incentives for coalition formation, cost-sharing and negotiation rules, share allocation and consultation mechanisms.

基于参与者依据协约结成大联盟但在收益分配过程中希望最大化各自收益的矛盾，本项目旨在以扩展形式对策及纳什均衡为工具，构建合作对策收益分配的投标、议价和谈判机制设计体系，利用非合作机制设计建立收益分配的动态策略。项目针对具有联盟结构的合作对策，首先采用结构分析研究可行联盟的特征，设计相应的扩展形式结构及联盟型投标机制；进而利用一致性、相关一致性和势函数性质，设计关于单值解的投标、议价机制；同时利用关于顶点分配向量的保凸线性变换，设计关于凸性集合解的谈判机制；最后通过数据模拟及理论分析，实现具有联盟结构合作对策收益的均衡分配方案。.通过本项目的研究，将非合作对策与合作对策相结合，丰富合作对策收益分配的研究方法和技术，拓展非合作机制及纳什均衡的研究内涵。其研究结果可以应用于欧债危机救助机制、NBA劳资谈判等问题的分析，为联盟形成激励机制、成本分摊及谈判机制、收益分配及协商机制的设计提供理论依据。

基于参与者依据协约结成大联盟但在收益分配过程中希望最大化各自收益的矛盾，本项目依据合作对策的联盟结构和分配方案的性质，研究具有联盟结构的合作对策收益分配的议价、投标及谈判机制设计，利用非合作机制设计建立收益分配的动态策略，探讨合作与竞争的博弈行为分析及分配机制的应用。. 利用一致性和相关一致性，研究了全联盟结构下线性解的公理化特征，并由相关一致性研究Shapley值的非合作价机制设计。基于平均主义和边际主义的特征，研究了α-CIS值、团结一致值的招投标机制设计。利用矩阵分析研究序联盟结构限制和区间收益下合作对策Shapley值的公理化特征；得到了根树限制结构下合作对策分配方案的公理化刻画，以及（具有模糊联盟的）图限制结构下Myerson值的性质、应用与非合作机制设计。通过引入IDP动态分配机制，研究网络合作对策分配方案的时间一致性与动态演化机制，实现了网络合作对策区间Shapley值的时间一致性以及核心支付向量的强时间一致性。基于Fenchel Moreau理论利用间接函数研究了妥协稳定对策的核子；探讨了双准衡合作对策的τ值及其公理化。基于保凸线性变换研究集合解的公理化特征和极点的实现机制。此外，应用演化博弈理论研究社会网络的合作演化特性及生态系统的稳定性，探讨了捕食－食饵系统交互作用和捕食策略。提出了成本分摊问题的破产机制实现方法，并应用破产对策模型探讨高校生源危机的应对策略。研究了机场盈利对策、破产对策、信息市场对策的收益分配及成本分摊的合理性与机制设计。. 项目研究提出的机制设计方法丰富了合作博弈及动态博弈收益分配的实现途径，为公共设施建设、社会资源共享等复杂环境下成本分摊与收益分配过程中激励合作机制、分配机制分析提供了理论依据，有助于分析与应对经济机制转型中可能出现的问题。项目成果发表学术论文32篇，其中SCI、SSCI检索17篇。举办国际会议2次、国内会议3次，培养博士生6名、硕士生15名。