动态联盟结构下成本对策分配方案及其机制设计研究

In real life, fair and reasonable allocation and its implementation play significant factors in the formation of the coalition. In this context, the project aims to design the allocation of the cost game with dynamic coalitional structure. Also, the implementation of its mechanism is considered, based on game theory approach. .First of all, the dynamic cost game is characterized, due to the application of minimum spanning tree theory to dynamic coalitional structure by using the undirected graph expressing the dynamic coalitional structure. Secondly, the egocentric, equalitarian and eclecticism allocations are fully determined, respectively, on the basis of linearity applied to an appealing decomposition of the dynamic cost game into unanimity games. As an accessory, the relationship between the levels of players’ predilection for the individual marginal contribution and the allocations is reveled, which can be used to study the intimate association between the stability of the alliances and the distributions. Finally, the mechanism of the allocation is aptly designed by determining the net bid, and projecting the rules of bargaining、leaving and re-playing the game for the players, with the aid of significant properties of the scheme as well as the order of the alliance..The allocation and its implementation are integrated through this research. The theoretical results can not only enrich the methods and techniques of the allocation, but also has a widespread application value and prospect, especially in economic management, such as incentives for dynamic coalitional formation, cost-sharing, and mechanisms. Peculiarly, the theory in this project can be applied to analyze and solve the cost allocation problems involved with “one belt, one way”.

公平合理的分配方案及科学的机制设计是促成成本对策中动态联盟稳定合作的核心因素。项目拟围绕动态联盟结构下成本对策（简称动态成本对策）的分配方案及其机制设计开展科学研究。.具体包括：1)建立动态联盟结构与无向图的关系，设计限制结构下无向图的最小生成树算法，研究动态联盟成本的特征表示，构建动态成本对策模型；2)提出动态成本对策空间的基对策分解方法，研究不同价值取向下动态成本对策分配方案及其公理化性质，揭示不同价值取向与分配方案的联系，探索动态联盟稳定性与分配方案间的关系；3)基于分配方案的特性，结合参与者加入大联盟的顺序，设计参与者投标、议价以及退出、重新进入对策的规则，研究动态成本对策分配方案的机制设计，探索参与者动态结盟的规律。项目的研究将动态成本对策的分配方案及其实现有机结合起来，为动态联盟形成的成本分摊及机制设计提供理论依据。研究成果可以应用于“一带一路”合作投资成本分摊方案的分析。

公平合理的分配方案及科学的机制设计是促成成本对策中动态联盟稳定合作的核心因素。项目探讨了动态联盟结构下成本对策（简称动态成本对策）的分配方案及其机制设计问题。项目主要结论如下：1)基于动态联盟结构与无向图的关系，设计限制结构下无向图的最小生成树算法，研究动态联盟成本的期望特征表示，构建了动态成本对策模型；2)通过对动态成本对策进行基对策分解，研究功利、均分以及利己主义三类价值取向下动态成本对策分配方案及其性质，揭示不同价值取向与分配方案的联系，探索动态联盟稳定性与ENSC值、CIS值等分配方案间的关系；3)基于ENSC值、CIS值、Shapley值等分配方案的性质，结合参与者加入大联盟的顺序，设计参与者投标、议价以及退出、重新进入对策的规则，研究动态成本对策分配方案的机制设计，探索参与者动态结盟的规律。项目的研究将动态成本对策的分配方案及其实现有机结合起来，为动态联盟形成的成本分摊及机制设计提供理论依据。从2017年项目立项以来，项目负责人依据项目申请书进度安排，顺利完成了计划书中的各项研究工作，研究结果得到同行认可，部分成果在GEB等国际顶尖期刊上发表。具体地，项目负责人在国际重要的经济学和运筹学期刊中发表论文14篇；以此为基础进行应用研究，将理论成果应用于机场共建、水污染共同治理、“一带一路”合作投资成本分摊以及共同导弹防御等经济管理问题中，为决策者提供决策理论依据。项目的研究成果涵盖了项目计划的内容。