国有企业高管升迁、薪酬激励与企业价值

Top executives of state-owned enterprises are not only managers, but also seudo bureaucratics. To investigate the executive incentive mechanism in state-owned enpterprises, it's not enough to focus on cash compensation. Management turnover is important implicit incentive. The threat of being demoted gives managers pressure to improve firm performance. However, to be promoted, managers need to fullfill political or social demand besides good performance. Such mechanism might induce different behavior on investment, tunneling, and taking social burden of firms. As a daily incentive mechanism, cash compensation has the same target but different timeline. As a result, cash compensation at different stage and under different circumstances of management turnover may vary. Based on latge sample empirical study and case study, this project aims to analyze the relationship between management turnover and firm performance under different circumstances, the effect of management turnover on firm's investment efficiency, tunneling, and the willingness to take social burden, the correlation between management turnover and cash compensation, as well as the efffect of different types of incentive mechanism on firm value. The results of this project will facilitate our understanding to the composition, efficiency, and economic consequense of incentive mechanism in state-owned enterprises. It is also helpful for improving the incentive mechanism in state-owned enterprises.

国有企业的高管不仅是管理层，而且是"准官员"。研究国有企业高管的激励机制，不能仅停留在薪酬上，职位升降是不可替代的隐性激励。降职的威胁促使高管努力工作提升业绩，但由于国有企业目标多元化，高管升迁未必都靠优良的业绩，还可能与其他政治和社会目标相关，这些都可能导致企业在投资效率、利益输送、承担社会负担等方面有不同的表现。作为一种日常激励机制，薪酬激励与职位激励有相同的目标和不同的激励周期，从而可能表现出在高管职位变化的不同时期、不同类型的职位变化下薪酬激励水平和有效性的变化。本课题将通过大样本和典型案例的研究，全面分析国有企业高管不同形式职位变更与业绩的相关性；对企业投资效率、利益输送、承担社会负担等行为的影响；与薪酬激励的关系；以及不同职位薪酬激励组合对企业价值的影响。本课题的研究结果将为更全面地认识国有企业激励机制的构成、效果和经济后果提供实证证据，并为完善国有企业的激励机制提供借鉴。

国有企业的高管不仅是管理层，而且是"准官员"。研究国有企业高管的激励机制，不能仅停留在薪酬上，职位升降是不可替代的隐性激励。本研究系统考察了国有企业高管的晋升激励和薪酬激励的运作机制、相互关系及其经济后果。我们的研究发现，降职的威胁促使高管努力工作提升业绩，但由于国有企业目标多元化，高管升迁未必都靠优良的业绩，还可能与其他政治和社会目标相关，这些都可能导致企业在投资效率、利益输送、承担社会负担等方面有不同的表现。作为一种日常激励机制， 薪酬激励与职位激励有不同的激励周期和激励目标，并且薪酬与晋升激励的作用机制在相对偏重行政目标的国企和偏重市场目标的国企中也存在显著差异。在晋升激励方面，国企高管具有不同的晋升通道，这种差异导致他们在执行宏观政策时有不同的决策，并且对企业业绩产生长期影响。对国企高管选拔机制的研究进一步表明，行政型国企与市场性国企有不同的选聘高管的机制，相对于高管背景而言，企业性质对于企业决策有效性的影响更加重要，因此在不改变国企类型的情况下，仅仅通过选拔更具商业和时长背景的高管并不能提升企业的决策有效性，这主要是由于企业类型不变的情况下，薪酬和晋升激励所考虑的因素都没有变化。