高管政治晋升与国有企业创新：激励有效性与潜在机制

Under the national strategy of innovation-driven development, the state-owned enterprises will play an important role in the strategy of "popular entrepreneurship and innovation". An interesting finding is that the innovation efficiency of state-owned enterprises with innovation resource advantage is significantly lower than that in non-state-owned enterprises though the innovation investment of SOE is higher. Talents play an important role in the enterprises’ innovation. As the main decision makers, executives contribute to the enterprises’ innovation. However, innovation incentive mechanism is different from standard salary incentive mechanism. Standard salary incentive mechanism is to solve the agency problem, while innovation incentive mechanism is to improve executives’ risk tolerance. Innovation will definitely become the critical factor in the incentive and evaluation system to executives, and it becomes an effective way to express personal performance. Now the salary caps policy is very common in the state-owned enterprises, and the central government's anti-corruption policy has also restricted executives’ perks. What’s more, the state-owned-enterprises’ executives have strong political aspirations. As a result, political promotion becomes a possible path to motivate the SOE executives. The existing research has already involved the incentive role of political promotion in the innovation of state-owned enterprises’ executives. However, they haven’t discussed the potential conflict between the short-term effect of political promotion and the long-cycle character of innovation investment. Based on the theories of catering and tournament, this project tries to analyze the status of "political people" of senior executives of state-owned enterprises, trying to dynamically test the difference of managers’ behavior from the perspective of sustainability and substance of Innovation, in order to reveal the political pandering motive of SOE’s executives. We further examine the regulation effect of political environment, promotion environment and senior management characteristics in the impact of political promotion on executives’ innovation behavior, so that we can analyze the possible effect of external environment and personal character on the innovation decision. We take empirical method and case study, using the data of the innovation input, patent and enterprise performance of state-owned enterprises, to test the innovation catering behavior under the political motivation of senior executives, and to reveal the internal mechanism of innovation catering. This project can enrich literature about consequence of political promotion, and extend the research on enterprise innovation. This study can provide the underpinnings for state-owned enterprises to make more scientific incentives and for the government to make more reasonable evaluation and promotion system and improve the efficiency of innovation.

国家创新驱动发展战略下，国有企业在“双创”进程中扮演着重要角色。创新驱动的实质是人才驱动，提高创新效率重在强化创新激励。目前，创新指标已纳入国有企业的业绩考核范畴，成为国有企业高管表现个人政绩的有效途径。当前国有企业严格限薪并长期存在，中央反腐高压态势对高管的在职消费也予以限制，且国企高管具有强烈的政治抱负，因此，政治晋升成为国企高管创新激励的可能路径。现有研究已经关注政治晋升在国企高管创新中的激励作用，然而，对政治晋升的短期效应与创新投资长期性的潜在矛盾认识不足。本课题基于迎合理论和锦标赛理论，深入分析国企高管的“政治人”身份，并从创新持续性和实质性两个方面动态检验高管晋升前后的行为差异，从而揭示国企高管的政治迎合动机。进一步，课题还将从制度、企业和个人三个层面分析政治环境、晋升环境与高管特质在晋升激励影响国有企业创新行为中的调节作用，强调外在环境和个人因素在创新决策中的重要影响。课题采用案例研究和实证研究等方法，运用创新投入、专利及企业绩效等数据，研究成果将丰富政治晋升经济后果的相关文献，拓展企业创新研究视角，为政府制定更加合理的考核制度和晋升机制、提高国有企业创新效率提供借鉴。

随着数字化经济时代的到来，加强创新投入并提升企业的创新水平已成为增强企业竞争力的重要法宝，关乎企业生存和发展。企业创新水平和效率的提升将影响到国家的经济转型与未来发展态势。习近平总书记在党的十九大报告中指出，创新是引领发展的第一动力，是建设现代化经济体系的战略支撑。国家创新驱动发展战略下，国有企业在“双创”进程中扮演着重要角色。目前，创新指标已纳入国有企业高管的业绩考核范畴，成为国有企业高管表现个人政绩的有效途径。现有研究已经关注晋升在国企高管创新中的激励作用，然而对政治晋升的短期效应与创新投资长期性的潜在矛盾认识不足。本课题基于迎合理论和锦标赛理论，深入分析高管激励对企业创新行为的影响，进一步揭示国企高管的政治迎合动机。课题采用案例研究和实证研究等方法，研究有如下发现：1.企业高管晋升激励下的创新投入水平和创新产出水平均有显著提升；2.以高管年龄为晋升机会的替代变量，研究发现在国有企业中，高管年龄与企业创新呈负相关关系，而这种负相关关系在中央企业中更为显著，表明晋升机会越高企业创新行为越明显，尤其在创新升级为国家战略情况下，上述结果更显著；3.我们进一步关注了不同类型的创新产出，研究发现，国有企业高管在创新升级为国家战略后的策略性创新行为更显著，且中央企业和地方国有企业中呈现不一致的结果；4.从外部政治环境的角度，课题分析了地方官员变更对高管晋升激励影响企业创新的结果，发现当地区官员晋升时，其晋升前所在地区上市公司高管晋升激励与企业创新的正相关关系更显著，且这种关系主要体现在国有企业中；5.此外，我们还进一步拓展了相关研究，从高管的社会网络关系、高管和员工的薪酬公平性角度分析了高管激励对企业创新的影响。课题成果将丰富高管晋升激励经济后果的相关研究，拓展企业创新研究视角，为政府制定更加合理的考核制度和晋升机制、提高国有企业创新效率提供借鉴，为更好地为国家创新战略服务提供思路。