证券监管处罚对未违规高管的间接威慑效应：基于高管社会关系网络视角的研究

Besides market discipline and private litigation, powerful government regulation can be another mechanism to solve the misconducts in the capital market. The deterrent effect of securities regulatory punishments has become a hot topic of common concern among the regulator, practitioners and academics. A large number of literature has verified the direct deterrence effect of securities regulatory punishments on the guilty ones. However, regulatory punishments are not only aimed at the guilty ones, but also intended to deter the innocent ones that connected with the guilty ones from committing wrongdoings. The project aims to study the indirect deterrence effect of securities regulatory punishments on the innocent top managers based on top managers’ social networks. The project forms a theoretical framework by dint of Social Learning Theory and Social Network Theory and then makes a concrete analysis of the indirect deterrence effect of securities regulatory punishments on the innocent top managers’ information disclosure, fund usage and market trading, which are all related to securities regulatory laws. In addition, the project also tests the economic consequences of the indirect deterrence effect of securities regulatory punishments by analyzing the market pricing efficiency and firms’ performance. Finally, the project not only expands the research boundary and clarifies the impact channel of the deterrence effect of regulatory punishments, but also provides the government regulator with beneficial enlightenment to thoroughly evaluate securities regulatory effect and improve securities regulatory system.

为了应对资本市场中的不端行为，强有力的政府监管成为弥补和替代市场机制和司法机制的重要手段，证券监管处罚的威慑效应由此成为监管层、实务界和学术界共同关心的热点话题。大量文献验证了证券监管处罚对违规主体的直接威慑效应，但是实际上，监管处罚并非只是针对违规主体，更是意图震慑与违规主体相关联的其他未违规主体。本课题旨在基于高管社会关系网络视角研究证券监管处罚对未违规高管的间接威慑效应，通过借助社会学习理论和社会关系网络学说，并结合证券监管相关法律法规要求，具体考察证券监管处罚对未违规高管的信息披露、资金使用、市场交易三方面行为的间接威慑效应，进而从市场层面的定价效率和公司层面的业绩表现考察证券监管处罚间接威慑效应的经济后果。本课题的研究不仅拓展了监管处罚威慑效应的研究边界，也明晰了监管处罚间接威慑效应的传导渠道，此外还对监管层全面评价证券监管效果、完善证券监管制度提供了有益启示。

政府监管效果与具体的制度环境密切相关，社会关系对政府监管效果的生成具有非常重要的影响。在资本市场中，证券监管处罚并非只是针对违规主体，更是意图震慑与违规主体相关联的其他未违规主体。本项目基于高管社会关系网络视角研究证券监管处罚对未违规高管的间接威慑效应，具体考察证券监管处罚对未违规高管的信息披露、资金使用、市场交易等行为的间接威慑效应，进而从市场定价效率和公司价值表现考察证券监管处罚间接威慑效应的经济后果。基于证券违规处理、高管个体社会关系等关键数据的研究发现，首先，监管处罚能够减少违规高管的未违规亲属、同事等的内部人交易，这一结果随着与违规高管社会关系紧密程度的减弱而依次递减，并且监管处罚还能够在降低内部人交易的情况下降低买卖价差、股价同步性和股价崩盘风险；其次，同地区违规被罚的同行个体越多，未违规独立董事个体获得的薪酬越高，这一结果在两者曾是同事时更显著，并且这些未违规独立董事个体越少地离职、越多地出席董事会会议和对议案投否决票，他们所在未违规公司的超额在职消费和财务重述都越少；另外，监管处罚反而造成违规高管联结的未违规公司财务错报明显增加，这源于积极发表否定意见的独立董事从未违规公司辞职、审计师未有效调整审计决策，并且上述间接威慑失效导致这些未违规公司的公司价值受到减损。上述研究不仅从高管个体层面拓展了监管处罚间接威慑效应的研究边界，而且从社会关系网络视角明晰了监管处罚间接威慑效应的传导渠道，另外强调了监管处罚间接威慑的有效性有赖于内外部公司治理机制的协调配合，还对监管层全面评价证券监管效果、完善证券监管制度提供了有益启示。此外，本项目还围绕社会关系对政府监管质量的影响、政府监管在宏观和微观层面的效果进行了拓展性研究，主要发现监管者与被监管者之间的社会关系会弱化政府监管质量，表明社会关系也会引发政府监管的利益冲突，这对完善公共部门的监管治理也具有重要启示。