管理层利益诉求与公司策略性信息披露——基于实地调研视角研究

private in-house meeting is the main approach for institutional investors to obtain company information in China. Information disclosure of private in-house meeting is more or less at the discretion of firm’s management. Existing research shows that management can obtain excess earnings by means of information manipulation and inside trade; whether the management will take advantage of private in-house meeting to realize their interest demands, such as market value management, anticipated negative information management and market visibility enhancement. From 2009 to 2015, the information disclosure regulation of private in-house meeting in China has experienced gradual evolution, from voluntary disclosure, mandatory disclosure in annual report, to mandatory disclosure real time, which provides unique research environment for this project, ie. to study whether it is possible for management to realize their interest demand expectation through private in-house meeting under different regulation background. Based on this, we explore how management can realize their interest demand through willingness adjustment and strategic information disclosure. This project is of theoretical significance in elucidating management interest demand in private in-house meeting, broadening research horizon of management strategic information disclosure and establishing indicator system measuring management willingness of private in-house meeting. And it also provides empirical evidences on further optimization of private in-house meeting information disclosure for regulators, and system establishment of investor relationship under the background of registration-based IPO system for firms.

实地调研是中国上市公司发生频率最高的私下接触方式。管理层作为实地调研中信息披露的主体，具有较多自主权和选择权，现有研究发现管理层通过对公司的信息操控等行为可获取超额收益，那么，管理层是否会通过实地调研实现其利益诉求？2009-2015年，中国实地调研信息披露制度经历了从鼓励自愿披露—强制年报披露—强制及时披露的渐进式演进过程，给本课题提供了独特的研究环境：在不同制度背景下，实地调研是否为管理层实现利益诉求提供可能；在此基础上，探究管理层如何调节调研意愿度高低和选择策略性信息披露组合，实现其利益诉求。课题拟采用访谈得到实地调研中管理层的利益诉求、文本分析管理层在调研纪要中回答问题语调和使用场景要素衡量管理层调研意愿度高低，对明晰管理层利益诉求、拓宽策略性信息披露研究半径、衡量管理层调研意愿度具有理论意义，并为监管层进一步优化实地调研信息披露规则和公司建立注册制改革背景下的投资者关系制度提供经

实地调研中管理层对实地调研中的信息披露具有更多自主权和选择权，那么，实地调研中，管理层是否会通过策略性信息披露实现其利益诉求。项目使用2012年至2014年深圳证券交易所约17,000个“投资者关系活动记录表”，研究发现：实地调研会议具有显著市场信息含量，公司内部人在实地调研前后20天内进行一半以上卖出行为（约560亿）；公司内部人会基于实地调研中披露信息进行精准买卖股票，即在不好信息披露之前卖出相对较多的股票，并在会议中披露好消息时推迟卖出股票；基于文本分析发现，“投资者关系记录表”中文本纪要具有信息含量，文本纪要的语气语调与股票市场反应具有显著相关。在此基础上，探究相比于上交所自愿披露，深交所实地调研强制信息披露制度变化如何影响市场信息环境和治理监督机制规制公司策略性信息披露的效果差异。.项目主要基于深交所实地调研数据展开研究，不仅为实地调研信息披露在上交所是否具有普适性提供依据，也为全球主要其他资本市场市场投资者与上市公司管理层之间进行私下接触的信息披露数据提供有力借鉴。