关联持股下的代理问题研究：股东合谋与堑壕防御视角

Relation-based ownership structure is the kind of ownership structure when the controlling shareholder holds a company together with her related parties. This kind of ownership structure is so typical and popular among modern companies that its governance efficiency is crucial to the property reform in stated-owned enterprises and the succession in family business. Our project focus on the agency problems raised in the related-based ownership structures. We analyze how the relation-based ownership structure forms and reaches a balance, and construct the theory that shareholders may collude and entrench under such a structure. We examine the tunneling activities of controlling shareholders, the way to benefit of related shareholders, and the efficiency of takeover market under the related-based ownership structure, to find out whether related shareholders alleviate or aggravate the appropriation of minority shareholders by controlling shareholders, whether related shareholder engage in moral hazard activities, and whether relation-based ownership improve or weaken the efficiency of takeover market. While extant literature focus on the property contract between shareholders and the firm, our project pays attention to the various contracts between shareholders to analyze how these relations affect the power allocation, agency problem and corporate governance efficiency in modern enterprises. Our research is helpful to understand the way how ultimate owners controls a firm and the case why multiply shareholder cannot monitor each other. We also provide empirical evidence and policy suggestions on the designation of ownership structure and corporate governance system and the prevention and monitoring of shareholder collusion.

关联持股是控股股东及其关联股东共同持股的股权结构，是现代企业一种典型的组织形式，其运行效率涉及到当前国有企业如何发展混合所有制的问题，以及民营企业如何代际传承的问题。本项目围绕关联持股结构下的代理问题而开展。通过系统分析关联持股结构的形成演变，分析关联持股结构下股东合谋和堑壕防御的机理，实证检验关联持股结构下的控股股东侵占行为、关联股东获利方式和关联持股联盟对控制权市场效率的影响，探究关联持股缓解抑或加重控股股东的利益侵占问题、关联股东自身是否存在利益侵占问题、以及关联持股结构提高抑或降低外部公司治理机制的效率。本项目突破已有股权结构研究仅关注股东—公司之间的产权契约的局限，探究股东—股东之间多种契约形式下的关联对公司权力结构、代理问题和治理效率的影响。本项目的研究有助于加深对股东控制方式、股权制衡失效等现象的理解，为我国企业优化产权结构、提高治理效率、防范股东合谋提供经验参考和政策建议。

本项目从“关联持股”的角度对股权结构进行新的认识和刻画，分析关联股东对现代企业内部的权力结构、代理问题和公司治理所造成的影响。以中国A股上市公司为样本，手工搜集控股股东的关联股东在持股和权力配置方面的数据。研究发现：.（1）“关系基础”的股权结构在我国上市公司中广泛存在。关联股东通过持有股份、委派董事、监事或高级管理人员等方式参与公司的决策和经营管理。对关联股东权力的配置，隐蔽地提高了控股股东的控制力。.（2）关联股东的持股与权力配置加剧了控股股东侵占中小股东利益的第二类代理问题。关联股东的存在和持股比例与控股股东的资金占用比例正相关。该现象在关联股东获得超额董监高权力的情形下，以及在民营企业中更为明显。.（3）关联股东利用其权力与信息优势获取私利，自身带来第二类代理问题。对股改后的股东减持事件进行分析，发现关联股东减持前的累积超额收益显著高于非关联股东，该现象在非关联股东监督较弱、分析师跟踪较少的情况下更为显著。.（4）关联持股带来控股联盟效应，降低外部控制权市场对第二类代理问题的治理效率。在关联持股的结构下，绩效低下的公司也难以发生控制权转移。关联持股一方面提高了“付现成本”，另一方面带来“谈判成本”。当关联持股联盟因控制权转移而瓦解时，公司的短期市场绩效、长期财务绩效和公司价值均能得到提升。 .本项目的研究表明，关联持股加剧现代企业的两类代理问题，并带来负面的经济后果。基于以上发现，本项目在股东信息披露、股东权力配置、发展积极投资者、完善发起人制度、加强对关联股东的监管等方面有重要的政策含义。