基于网络外部性的供应链运营策略和政府干预机制研究

Obvious network externality, increasing product upgrading, and large society externality for public interests goods brings large challenge for the operations and marketing management of supply chain. Applying the main tools such as game theory and operations research, this project integrates computer simulation technology, develops dynamic programming and game model and investigates the effect of non-linear network externality on the designing, marketing and issuing strategy for multi-generation products in a supply chain. We analyze the incentive of the investment in network externality and its coordination mechanism for different members of the supply chain. We explore how to design the signaling mechanism for the information on negative network externality. We seek for government intervention mechanism for public interest goods to improve the welfare of the whole society. We analyze the effect of factors such as network externality, demand uncertainty, and channel and product structure on the equilibrium decisions of the supply chain and the performance of its members, consumer surplus as well as the whole society welfare. The main content includes study on the designing, marketing and issuing strategy of multi-generation products in a supply chain based on non-linear network externality, study on the incentive of the investment in network externality and its coordination mechanism in a supply chain, study on the signaling mechanism with asymmetric information on negative network externality, and the government intervention mechanism for the public interest goods with network externality. This project provides reference for network externality management in a supply chain and government intervention mechanism designing.

产品网络外部性特征明显、更新换代加速、公共利益产品社会外部性大给供应链运作和营销管理带来很大的挑战。本项目以博弈论、运筹学为主要工具，结合计算机仿真技术，基于存在网络外部性的供应链，建立动态规划和博弈模型，研究非线性网络外部性对供应链多代产品设计、营销和发布策略的影响；分析供应链不同成员企业网络外部性投资动机及其协调机制；探讨负向网络外部性信息的信号发送机制；寻求公共利益产品的政府干预机制提高社会整体福利。分析网络外部性、需求不确定性、渠道和产品结构等因素对供应链均衡决策及其成员绩效、消费者剩余和社会整体福利的影响。主要研究内容包括：基于非线性网络外部性的供应链多代产品设计、营销和发布策略研究；供应链网络外部性投资动机及其协调机制研究；负向网络外部性信息不对称情况下信号发送机制研究；网络外部性公共利益产品的政府干预机制研究。研究结果为供应链网络外部性管理和政府干预机制设计提供决策参考。

基于网络外部性是电商平台的典型特征，线上渠道与线下渠道之间存在网络外部性等背景，本项目建立博弈论模型和最优化模型，研究电商供应链销售模式选择、网络外部性产品的供应链渠道模式等问题，研究得到以下主要结论：.①电商销售模式取决于供应商渠道溢出效应、供应商线上竞争强度、供应商线上成本优势等因素，价格竞争与数量竞争的均衡结果有所不同。.②网络外部性大小影响供应链均衡结果和渠道选择策略，存在关于网络外部性的帕累托区间，制造商和零售商在双渠道模式下都获得比单渠道更多的利润。.③当新旧产品无质量差异时，随着网络外部性增强，企业可以采取低价格和高回收策略谋取更大利润；反之，随着网络外部性增强，企业可以适当提高产品价格。.④最优的销售渠道选择依赖于第三方物流供应商的物流能力、引进在线渠道所获得的市场规模的增量以及需求竞争的强度。.⑤有更高单位质量生产成本的制造商有更大的动机提供质量偏好信息，随着市场信息水平增加，信息披露者的角色从上游转变成下游。信息披露同时降低了供应链中横向和纵向竞争。.⑥当不被告知消费者的比例较低或非常高，零售商选择双供应商结构；而当该比例适当高，零售商选择一个高质量供应商以服务于两种类型的消费者群体。当告知消费者的比例更低时，零售商选择低价策略；否则，它采取高价策略。.⑦如果消费者访问零售商的成本不为零时，存在直销渠道需求为正的双渠道模式，最优批发价格比单渠道模式下的大，制造商获利，而零售商受损。.⑧当快速响应同时作用于制造商和零售商时，批发价格、直销和零售渠道的售价增加，零售商的初始订货数量减少，而制造商的直销库存则在零售商市场占有率较小时减少，反之增加。快速响应缓解策略消费者行为带来的不利影响。.⑨在发展初期，政府可考虑同时实施补贴和双积分政策，当生产新能源汽车的制造商人口比例达到指定值时，可提高双积分比例要求来替代政府补贴。.相关结论为供应链的运营策略和政府的干预机制提供了决策参考。