政府引导基金驱动民间资本参与创业投资的风险补偿选择及权益结构设计研究

In this project, we start from the earnings appeal of private capital, based on the uncertainty risk of venture capital fund income and information asymmetry risk of complicated principal-agent relationship chain in the main participates, we research on the behavior choice of risk compensation and the design of equity structure of leading fund, according earnings appeal of private capital. Firstly, according to the analysis influencing factors and mechanism of the participation of private capital in the venture capital, we extract the checks and drivers of private capital, and we clear the earnings appeal of private capital. Secondly, from the aspect of income uncertainty of venture capital, we set up the real option model of income compensation, loss return and other mixed risk compensation, evaluate the matching degree of risk compensation model and the earnings appeal of private capital, calculate the boundary conditions of risk compensation model application, and then give the risk compensation model and the opportunity election of the exit of the government. Thirdly, put the uncertainty risk of venture capital fund income and risk compensation election of the government to the utility function of the leading fund operation participates, set up the equity ratio model, and then give the optimal design of equity structure of the main participants，give government incentive strategy to private capital and venture capitalists. Finally, give the risk compensation policy of the government and evaluate the incentive effect...

本项目以满足民间资本收益诉求为着眼点，以创新企业引发的创投基金收益不确定性和参与主体间信息不对称风险为线索，研究引导基金风险补偿行为选择及权益结构设计问题。首先，基于民间资本参与创业投资影响因素及作用机理分析，提炼民间资本制约与驱动因素，明确民间资本收益诉求；其次，构建收益补偿、亏损补偿及多种形式的复合补偿等风险补偿模式实物期权模型，从风险补偿模式对民间资本收益诉求匹配度评价、风险补偿模式选择边界测算、政府退出时机选择，给出创投基金收益不确定条件下引导基金风险补偿行为选择依据；再次，基于创投基金收益不确定性和政府行为选择对参与主体收益的影响分析，多元参与主体参与与激励相容约束分析，构建多元参与主体权益配置模型，优化设计不同风险补偿模式下参与主体权益结构，给出驱动民间资本和防范基金管理机构道德风险的政府让利策略；最后，通过情景分析给出政府驱动民间资本的风险补偿政策建议并评测其激励效应。

为了揭示政府引导基金驱动民间资本参与创业投资的行为选择，本项目首先对民间资本关注的创业投资的特点及其作用机理进行了研究，得出创业投资机构的专业性和商务技巧是被投企业所缺乏的，能令被投企业成功的重要影响因素，而当创业投资机构和创业企业家隐匿信息并引发道德危害，则会影响创业投资结果。第二，分析了引导基金风险补偿期权特性和投资机构行为选择。以英国VC引导基金的激励形式为依据，构建了期权模型，研究了亏损股权补偿及盈利股权让利模式下政府风险补偿模式的期权特性。从不确定性的视角，对创业投资中可转换证券和估值调整协议的价值曲线进行了比较，得出随着项目价值不同时，这两种金融工具带给风险投资机构的收益差异，并结合纯股权、纯债权，依此给出风险投资金融工具在不同情形的使用策略。第三，多元参与主体权益分配。构建政府引导基金补偿模式的模型，分析了在项目经营状况不一致时，政府的风险补偿行为选择。构建基于双向道德危害的风险投资机构与创业企业的股权分配模型，分析并比较了基于可转换证券、估值调整协议的投资机构最优股权分配及其影响因素。第四，探索性的研究了分级基金的期权特性及持有策略，为不同风险偏好投资者的风险与收益问题打开了新的研究视角。