基于绩效测度的基础设施PPP项目动态联动补偿机制研究

Infrastructure PPP project is characterized by its high investment, long period,multiple stakeholders and complex external environment, thus traditional static compensation models can not tackle project of this kind properly. This project is focusing on domestic infrastructure PPP projects and try to construct a novel dynamic ganged compensation mechanism which is based on comprehensive performance measurement. By considering social benefit in this model, a novel dynamic infrastructure PPP project performance measurement model from the perspective of multiple stakeholders is proposed. Based on the exploration of multiple compensation of government and improvement of traditional game theory, reputation model and multi-objective optimization, the relationship between performance and compensation mechanism of PPP projects is revealed by the illustration of the dynamic performance measure we construct. Moreover, a simulative system of this model based on multi-agent system is constructed to explore the collaboration mechanism between performance and compensation. At last, the detailed contract of dynamic compensation mechanism of PPP projects and the re-negotiation framework is designed. Modifications will be made according to actual application environments. The results of this research will enhance the understanding of the complex relationship between performance and benefit of infrastructure PPP projects and at the same time provide significant intellectual and technical experience for the popularization of infrastructure PPP projects in China.

基础设施PPP项目具有投资巨大、周期长、利益相关者众多、外部环境复杂等特征，而以往静态的补偿机制不能满足PPP项目特征的要求。因此，本项目以我国基础设施PPP项目为研究对象，探索基于综合绩效测度的动态联动补偿机制。将社会效益纳入考量，提出动态绩效测度的新方法，构建利益相关者视角下基础设施PPP项目动态绩效测度模型。在探究多元化政府补偿方式的基础上，改进博弈、声誉模型、多目标优化等数理方法，构建基于绩效测度的动态联动补偿模型，揭示PPP项目绩效与补偿的交互作用机理。基于Multi-Agent System设计PPP项目的动态补偿仿真系统，探究绩效与补偿之间的联动机制。最终，进行PPP项目的动态补偿合约设计和再谈判框架设计，依据合约的应用情况对模型进行修正。本项目研究成果将深化对基础设施PPP项目绩效与收益间复杂作用机理的科学认识，为我国基础设施PPP项目管理实践提供坚实的科学思想和技术手段。

基础设施PPP项目具有投资巨大、周期长、利益相关者众多、外部环境复杂等特征，而以往静态的补偿机制不能满足PPP项目特征的要求。因此，本项目以我国基础设施PPP项目为研究对象，探索基于综合绩效测度的动态联动补偿机制。本项目按照“剖析现有缺陷、探索内在机理、破解关键问题、整合构建机制”的整体性研究思路，形成主要研究结论与贡献如下：①综合考虑政府、社会资本方以及社会公众三类重要利益相关者，构建了以社会效益整体最大化为导向的动态绩效测度模型，实证分析确定了项目安全绩效的影响因素和项目绩效的跨期效应；量化了PPP项目利益相关者影响力，揭示了绩效影响因素的传导机理；②设计了将事前补偿与事后补偿相关联，隐性、显性补偿形式相结合的多元化政府补偿机制；基于Stackelberg博弈理论，构建了按需求量补偿、按车公里补偿的政府与社会资本博弈模型，完善了现有PPP项目的补偿模式；构建了包含资金与资源的隐显性联合补偿机制，实现了事前事后补贴的联动；③以交通运输PPP项目为研究对象，构建了Stackelberg博弈模型，分别探究了基于项目整体绩效提升和基于建设和运营期两期项目质量提升的项目最优补偿计划及其性质，揭示了PPP项目绩效与补偿的交互作用机理；分析了在存在特定绩效影响因素——财务绩效亏损及政企机会主义行为的情境下，政府的最优补偿计划及其性质；针对动态补偿的负面棘轮效应设计了委托—代理模型，并引入声誉激励缓解棘轮效应；④提出了基础设施PPP项目的合理动态补偿合约方案，探究了合约的高效共识达成机制，实现了对合约达成过程中的不合作行为的识别与治理、群体聚类与关键人物识别，以及冲突消除，此类共识达成机制有助于动态补偿合约方案的制定及执行。本项目研究为PPP项目中绩效与收益联动机制方面的研究提供了理论基础，为我国基础设施 PPP 项目的管理实践提供了指导，同时促进了一类动态多目标优化理论与方法的创新。