PPP项目特许经营合同再谈判与补偿机制研究

Many infrastructure projects have been successfully developed around the world through public-private partnerships (PPPs). At the same time, various problems and even bankruptcy have occurred in a number of PPP projects due to the complexity of PPP projects and the incompleteness of concession contracts. It is impossible for concession contracts to describe all uncertainties and contingencies in the long concession period and many serious risk scenarios could occur and cause tremendous problems to the projects. In such occasions, the government has to bailout the project through renegotiation so as to prevent social welfare losses caused by these problems. In renegotiation, risks and benefits are re-shared between the public and private sectors and the government may pay compensation to the private sector if necessary to enable it to maintain the normal operation of the project. This research will focus on three core problems with regard to the renegotiation of PPP contracts. First, a renegotiation prevention mechanism will be built for the purpose of reducing the chance of renegotiations by identifying the driving factors, establishing the cause-effect paths, and reducing the degree of contract incompleteness through questionnaire surveys and case studies. Second, renegotiation decision-making models of both the government and the private sector will be developed based on game theory, which facilitate the analysis of the timing of the private sector to raise the issue of renegotiation or the timing of the public sector to accept it and can identify the optimal strategies and opportunistic behaviors of both sectors. Third, a quantitative renegotiation compensation model will be developed through cash flow analysis and Monte Carlo simulation, and applied to a real sample case to demonstrate its usefulness. In summary, this research will provide in-depth analysis of the various issues in renegotiation from both theoretical and practical aspects and the outputs of this research will promote the successful development and application of PPPs in more and more projects in different areas.

公私合作伙伴模式（PPP）在国内外广泛应用。由于PPP项目的复杂性以及特许经营合同的不完全性，项目在运营过程中常常会出现严重的风险状况，政府和私营方被迫对项目进行再谈判。本研究拟主要解决再谈判的三个核心问题。第一个核心问题是构建再谈判预防机制，通过合同与机制设计，减小特许经营合同的不完全性，以减少再谈判发生的概率。本研究将通过案例分析和问卷调查来识别再谈判关键诱因与路径，从而达到预防的目的。第二个核心问题是设计合理的公私双方再谈判决策机制。本研究将运用博弈论来构建双方的决策模型，从而确定双方的最优决策和识别机会主义行为。第三个核心问题是构建公私双赢的补偿机制和补偿额测算模型。本研究将通过风险分析，现金流分析，蒙特卡洛模拟来解决该问题，并运用于实际案例中。通过对PPP实践中发生的再谈判问题从理论与实际操作两个层面深入分析，本研究成果将对PPP的应用与发展具有重要的促进作用。

基础设施建设历来是政府的重要职能之一。随着中国城镇基础设施的发展，大量的资金需求对政府的公共建设预算产生了很大的压力。政府和社会资本合作（Public-Private Partnership, PPP）模式作为一种创新的项目融资与项目管理模式，已被我国很多地方政府采用。PPP项目涉及各行各业，包括高速公路、轨道交通、城市污水处理、发电站项目、保障性住房、医院、水利和环保等。PPP模式的应用很大程度地促进了我国基础设施的建设和发展。但是，由于PPP项目的复杂性、项目面临的长期不确定性和风险、以及合同的不完全性，并非所有的PPP项目都会按合同规定运营至合同期末并顺利移交。很多重大风险的发生都可能导致PPP项目陷入困境。政府和私营方必须进行再谈判以解决这种困境。PPP模式下，政府和私营方再谈判的比率相当高，政府和私营方都可能发起再谈判。另外，PPP项目建设和运营过程中还经常会出现投机行为和公私合谋等情况，从而导致私营方获得超额利润，国家财政资源受到损失。..本课题多种研究方法交叉应用，定性分析和定量分析相结合，对与再谈判有关的一些核心问题进行了研究。研究方法包括文献回顾、案例分析，问卷调查、专家访谈，统计分析、数学模型和计算机仿真。研究内容涉及PPP项目风险识别和预测、PPP项目失败机理研究、PPP项目再谈判的关键诱因和影响路径、PPP项目移交阶段的关键问题研究、PPP项目再谈判的预防机制、PPP项目再谈判流程与关键条款、信息不对称情况下PPP项目再谈判的决策模型、公私双赢的PPP项目再谈判补偿机制和PPP项目再谈判的实物期权模型。..本课题的研究成果对PPP项目的风险识别和防控，再谈判的流程和机制设计，为PPP合同提供必要的灵活性以应对项目环境在长期可能发生的变化而导致的风险，避免投机行为，保证PPP项目长期健康运行，实现公私双赢等，都具有重要的参考价值。对我国有效利用PPP促进基础设施建设与发展，提高项目建设和运营效率，降低地方政府债务风险，保持金融系统稳定，具有重要的理论和实践意义。