地方官员晋升、资源配置与企业扩张行为研究

Corporate expansion is an important phenomenon in transition period, and affected by official’s governance system with China’s style. The combination of Chinese decentralization and political centralization results in local officials’ incentives and abilities to drive corporate expansion. However, this field has attracted limited academic attention. This project aims to investigate the effects of local officials’ political promotion on corporate expansion and its economic consequences. The project attempts to solve three important questions: Firstly, is there political logic for explaining corporate expansion with China’s style? Is there political cycle for corporate expansion? Whether the effect of local officials’ political promotion on corporate expansion is the reason for overcapacity or not? Secondly, how local officials’ promotion would affect corporate investment and merger and acquisition activities? What roles would the critical resources and political connection perform? And what are economic effects result from corporate investment expansion and merger and acquisition expansion under the drive of political promotion? Thirdly, whether the effects of political promotion on corporate expansion would be different due to the differences in officials’ heterogeneity, economic uncertainty as well as other factors? How to restrain the effects of political promotion on corporate expansion? In theory, this project could enrich the political logic with China’s style for corporate expansions, investment and merger and acquisition activities, providing the theoretical explanation for overcapacity. In practice, this project would provide references for improving officials’ governance, supervision of corporate expansion, corporate governance and tackling overcapacity, thus promoting healthy and sustainable development of companies and macro economy.

企业扩张是转型时期重要的经济现象，受到中国特色官员治理模式的影响。中国式分权与政治集权的结合使得地方官员有动机和能力推动企业扩张，但现有研究对此关注有限。本项目拟重点考察地方官员晋升对企业扩张行为的影响及其经济后果。具体回答以下问题：第一，中国特色企业扩张行为的政治逻辑如何？是否存在官员晋升影响企业扩张的政治周期？官员晋升推动的企业扩张是否会导致产能过剩？第二，官员晋升如何影响企业投资扩张和并购扩张行为？关键资源、政治关联扮演了何种角色？政治晋升推动的投资与并购扩张会造成何种经济后果？第三，政治晋升的影响是否因官员异质性、经济不确定性等而异？如何抑制官员晋升对企业扩张的推动效应？理论上，本项目能够拓展和完善中国特色企业扩张、投资扩张、并购扩张行为的政治逻辑，提供产能过剩的理论解释。实践上，本项目能够为完善官员治理、企业扩张监管、公司治理及化解产能过剩进而推动企业和经济健康发展提供政策参考。

企业扩张是转型时期重要的经济现象，受到中国特色官员治理模式的影响。本项目重点考察地方官员对企业扩张行为的影响及其经济后果，分析关键资源配置在其中的重要作用，特别是尝试从地方官员的视角解释中国特色的企业产能过剩现象，探索如何抑制地方官员对企业扩张的推动效应。.本项目通过手工收集整理地方官员任职数据，匹配工业企业数据库、上市公司并购数据库、海关进出口数据库等相关数据开展实证研究工作。本项目的主要研究结论包括：（1）地方官员变更会加剧辖区内企业产能扩张，地方官员迫于政绩压力施加的干预是导致企业产能扩张的重要原因，税收、银行贷款、政府补贴等关键资源的配置在其中扮演了重要角色；（2）地方官员政治晋升会显著加剧当地企业并购交易，企业当年实施并完成并购交易的可能性显著增加、并购交易时间显著缩短，地方国有企业政治晋升期间实施的并购交易长期来看会导致并购绩效的恶化。晋升推动的企业并购加速能够获得更多的政府补贴和银行贷款；（3）通过与国外城市发展友好城市关系，地方政府和官员能够在促进企业对外直接投资方面起到制度促进的作用，表现为友好城市关系的建立能够显著增加当地对外投资，特别是官员未发生变更、任期较长时，这种促进作用越明显；（4）地方官员更替影响企业员工配置，官员更替时，国有企业“瘦身”能够“减负”“增效”，民营企业增加雇员尽管增加了劳动力成本但并不会“减效”，且能够获得更多的银行贷款和政府补贴。.本项目的研究还发现，政府审计能够显著抑制地方政府债务增长，提升地方政府债务治理能力；地方官员海外经历能够显著促进管辖地区企业的出口，海外经历能够克服制度距离对企业出口的负面影响、更好地配置出口补贴资源。.本项目对于拓展和完善中国特色企业扩张行为的理论逻辑以及理解中国式产能过剩问题具有一定的理论价值，相关研究结论还能够为完善地方政府和官员治理、公司治理进而建设国家治理体系，推动企业健康发展提供思路和参考。