宏观经济变动、产权背景与企业成本费用调整机制研究——效率导向抑或代理动机？

The enterprises' cost and expenses system would follow what kind of adjustment mechanism to adapt to the external macro-economic changes? What is its internal logic and what type of role would efficiency motivation or management agency motivation play? What kind of differences would be generated from these distinguish ownership enterprises especially on the cost and expenses adjustment mechanism? What are the potential reasons behind this? The project intends to observe the general cost and expenses, and their major components of Chinese listed companies based on their dynamic adjustment process, characteristics and laws during the overall macro-economic changes. Further, the study focuses on the longitudinal adjustment motivation, adjustment mechanism, the horizontal differences and their inner logic due to the key cost and expenses(e.g. Discretionary costs and expenses, compensation expenditures, perks, R&D expenses, fixed assets renew expenses and other long-term investment expenditures, etc.) among different ownership background enterprises, which provides theoretical and empirical evidence for better understanding the enterprises internal operation mechanism and government policy effects within Chinese special circumstance. The features of this project are that we will fully adhere to the relative change and asymmetric change principles from the "stickiness theory" in combination with the property background and two types of adjustment mechanism. We put the cost and expenses adjustment mechanism into a constantly changing external environment, hope it would be helpful for descibing and extracting the tracks, characteristics and laws on the key cost and expenses, and analyzing the dynamic adjustment mechanism at the same time.

在外部宏观经济变动下,企业的成本费用将遵循怎样的调整机制以适应这种变化，其内在逻辑是什么？这其中,效率动机和管理层代理动机又分别扮演什么样的角色？不同产权背景企业间的成本费用调整机制会出现怎样的差异，其背后原因是什么？项目拟在总体考察宏观经济变动下我国上市公司成本费用及其各主要构成部分的动态调整过程、特点和规律的基础上，研究不同产权背景上市公司的关键性成本费用（如酌量性成本费用、薪酬性支出、在职消费、研发支出和固定资产更新等长期投资支出等）的纵向调整动机、调整机制、横向差异及其内在机理，为认识中国情境下的企业内部运行机制和政府政策制定提供理论与经验证据。项目的特色在于，我们将充分借鉴"粘性"理论中的相对变化和非对称性变化原理，结合产权背景和两类调整动机，将企业成本费用的调整机制研究置于持续变化的外部环境中，从而有利于刻画和挖掘企业关键性成本费用调整的轨迹、特点与规律，剖析其动态调整机理。

本项目基于宏观经济变动下我国上市公司成本费用动态调整以及不同产权性质背景下上市公司调整机制的差异，分别针对企业集团劳动力成本、在职消费和管理层激励的调整机制开展深入研究。.针对企业劳动力成本调整机制的研究，对1999-2012年沪深两市面板数据进行估计，系统考察宏观经济因素与央企、地方国企与民营企业三组不同控股权性质上市公司的劳动力成本调整行为、劳动力成本粘性行为、超额雇员行为的关系，研究发现：①宏观经济因素利好有利于地方国企与民企的劳动力成本动态调整，但宏观经济因素对央企劳动力成本动态调整行为影响甚微；②在宏观经济形势上行，财政支出加大及宽松的货币政策情况下，劳动力成本粘性增强；③在经济形势上行、财政支出加大及宽松的货币政策的情况下，地方国企与民企的超额雇员有所减少，而央企的超额雇员与宏观经济因素相关性不强。.针对企业在职消费调整机制的研究，旨在研究宏观经济形势变动、政治环境变动以及货币政策变动的情况下，企业在职消费的调整机制及其对企业业绩的影响，得出结论：①我国企业在职消费使用效率总体较低，表现出代理成本的特征，其非效率特点在国有企业中更明显；②当前我国开展的反腐运动卓有成效，遏制了高管的奢侈性消费和寻租行为，对净化社会风气、促进社会公平有重要意义；③货币政策宽松时，寻租成本属性的在职消费和隐性激励属性的在职消费增加。.针对国有企业管理层激励调整机制的研究，研究了政府干预因素对薪酬管制效果的影响，政府薪酬管制政策对管理层激励水平和方向的调整，政府薪酬管制政策对管理层激励动态调整的影响，结论认为“一刀切”的薪酬管制政策整体效率不高，效果有限，我国政府应根据国有企业的功能定位、政府的控制程度以及控制层级对国有企业管理层薪酬实施分类的管控模式，这样有利于国有企业目标和价值的实现。