公司债务保守主义之谜：基于隐性契约利益相关者的解释

"Debt conservatism" is an international empirical phenomenon in corporate financial field, which has not yet been well explained by financial theories, and thus remains a mystery for financial economists. Based on the unique institutional environment in China, this project intends to theoretically and empirically study the impacts of the stakeholders with implicit contracts among employees, suppliers and customers on corporate financing decisions within the context of firm boundary that is jointly determined by explicit contracts and implicit contracts. From the perspective of stakeholders with implicit contracts, we do this by focusing on indirect costs of bankruptcy for employees, suppliers and customers. So this project intends to break through the limitations of traditional research that primarily focused on explicit contracts among stakeholders including shareholders, debtholders, managers, and the government. We are trying to provide a new explanation for the "debt conservatism" phenomenon that exists in capital market in China. This project contributes to the literature in the following two aspects: Firstly, we extend the stakeholders from those with explicit contracts among shareholders, debtholders, managers and the government to those with implicit contracts among employees, suppliers and customers, which expands the firm boundary and the factors that affect capital structure decisions, and thus overcomes the shortcoming that the previous studies trying to explain the capital structure within the context of firm boundary that is primarily determined by explicit contracts; Secondly, we extend the general capital structure to the "zero-leverage" which is an extreme form of capital structure, so we make up for shortcoming that previous studies ignored the special capital structure "zero-leverage". Therefore, this project is of a good theoretical innovation and great academic value.

"债务保守主义"是公司财务领域中世界各国普遍存在的一种实证现象，至今尚未得到理论和实证上较好的解释，因而亟待深入研究。本项目拟突破传统以显性契约为重点的研究局限，在由显性契约和隐性契约共同决定的企业边界框架下，结合我国特有的制度背景，从隐性契约利益相关者的视角，以间接破产成本为切入点，从理论和实证上分别考察员工、供应商和客户等隐性契约利益相关者对公司债务融资决策的影响，试图为我国资本市场上存在的"债务保守主义"现象提供一种新的解释。本项目拟在以下两方面有所创新：其一、从显性契约利益相关者拓展至隐性契约利益相关者，拓展了企业边界和资本结构影响因素，突破了以往研究侧重从以显性契约决定的企业边界框架下寻求资本结构解释的局限；其二、从一般意义的资本结构研究拓展至"零"杠杆这种极端资本结构"异象"的研究，弥补了以往研究忽视"零"债务这种特殊资本结构的研究不足。因此，本项目具有一定的理论创新和学术价值

项目针对我国资本市场上上市公司普遍存在的低杠杆的财务保守行为，从员工、供应商、客户等隐性契约利益相关者的视角，考察了员工、供应商和客户对公司财务政策的影响。研究发现，员工的薪酬水平与公司的债务比率显著负相关，与公司采取债务保守的概率显著正相关，并且在劳动者法律保护水平高的地区，员工的薪酬对公司债务比率和债务保守概率的影响程度更加明显；客户集中度与财务杠杆之间存在明显的正U型关系：一方面，当客户集中度处在较低阶段时，为了吸引和诱导客户进行关系型投资，供应商企业通过降低财务杠杆向客户“示好”，另一方面，当客户集中度处在较高阶段时，为了防范“客大欺店”的“敲竹杠”风险，提升自身议价能力，供应商企业又策略性地选择高财务杠杆向客户“示威”；供应商集中度越高，企业越可能发生债务保守行为，并且这种关系在非国有企业中较国有企业更加突出。项目主要从隐性契约利益相关者的视角解释了我国上市公司债务保守的现象。一是从显性契约利益相关者拓展至隐性契约利益相关者，拓展了企业边界和资本结构影响因素，突破了以往研究侧重从以显性契约决定的企业边界框架下寻求资本结构解释的局限；二是从一般意义的资本结构研究拓展至“零”杠杆这种极端资本结构“异象”的研究，弥补 了以往研究忽视“零”债务这种特殊资本结构的研究不足。