混合所有制改革背景下国有企业战略趋同研究：基于多重制度逻辑视角

The strategic choices of state-owned enterprise (SOE) may be further constrained when the Mixed-ownership reform introduces private capital into SOEs, because the conflict between the government logic and the market logic is strengthened. However, existing studies, especially the empirical studies, mainly focus on the effect of Mixed-ownership reform on SOEs’performance, and pay less attention to its role in the strategic choices of SOEs. Therefore, from the perspective of multiple institutional logics, this project aims to establish a systematic analytical framework on the strategic conformity of state-owned enterprises under the Mixed-ownership reform, and in particular, explore how such strategic activity is affected by the competing institutional logics (the government logic vs. the market logic) within the board of directors. Strategic conformity in this study is decomposed into two types, i.e., vertical strategic persistence and horizontal strategic conformity. Vertical strategic persistence represents historic conformity with a firm’s past behavioral pattern, while horizontal strategic conformity implies a firm’s conformity with the behavioral pattern of its peers or competitors. Both vertical strategic persistence and horizontal strategic conformity can be viewed as the outcome of power bargaining among the board of directors. Then, based on the four sources of power including structural power, ownership power, expert power, and prestige power, this study explores the contingent roles of power distance between the board presentations of government logic and the board presentations of market logic. We also introduce the joint moderating effects of the power distance and the performance expectation gap into our analytical model. The raw data for our study are mainly from CSMAR and WIND databases, and we will employ Bootstrap and OLS to test our model. Our study is helpful for us to open up the black box of the role of Mixed-ownership reform in shaping state-owned enterprises’ strategic choices, and extends the use of the perspective of multiple institutional logics in firms’ strategic choices.

在混合所有制改革中，民营资本的加入会加剧国有企业的政府逻辑和市场逻辑的冲突，进而制约其战略选择。然而，现有关于混合所有制改革对国有企业发展影响的研究，主要关注改制效果，很少探讨混合所有制改革对国有企业战略选择的影响。鉴于此，本项目提出基于多重制度逻辑视角的混合所有制国有企业战略趋同系统性分析框架，探讨在董事会层面上的政府逻辑和市场逻辑的冲突与战略趋同之间的关系。战略趋同可视为两种制度逻辑权力博弈的结果。由此，从结构、所有权、专家和声誉四个权力来源考察持不同制度逻辑的双方董事之间的权力距离对上述关系的权变影响，并引入权力距离与绩效期望差距的联合调节作用。我们将主要利用来自国泰安CSMAR和WIND数据库上的数据，运用Bootstrap检验方法和OLS回归对模型进行检验。这不仅有助于打开混合所有制改革在国有企业战略选择上的作用黑箱，而且有助于拓展多重制度逻辑视角在企业战略行为研究领域的应用。

本课题旨在基于新制度理论的视角，探讨混合所有制企业在多重制度逻辑作用下的战略响应问题。提出了如下理论观点：当面对多重制度逻辑冲突的时候，混合所有制企业倾向于采用具有平衡性的趋同战略以避免冲突的激化。并利用2002年至2012年中国企业对外直接投资活动作为实证情境检验了上述理论观点。在方法上，基于商务部发布的《境外投资企业（机构）名录》与国泰安（CSMAR）数据库的匹配数据，运用计量经济学方法进行二手数据的实证分析。研究发现：（1）符合政府逻辑和市场逻辑一致性的战略更容易被中国企业采用；（2）在政府逻辑和市场逻辑冲突的情况下，国有资本占主导的混合所有制企业倾向于采用符合政府逻辑的战略响应，而民营资本占主导的混合所有制企业更倾向于采用政府逻辑和市场逻辑相平衡的战略响应。本课题的主要理论意义在于深化了对组织响应多重制度逻辑影响的认识。