基于利益博弈视角的农村宅基地整理收益分享机制研究

It's important to governance the hollow village and improve the land use efficiency for the rural homestead consolidation. However the imbalance in income distribution has become a key issue to be solved in the current rural homestead consolidation. Game analysis of the relationship will help to form a reasonable income distribution mechanism between the stakeholders.This study will base on game theory,focus on pilot areas in Jiangsu Province,analyze income formation and distribution status, clear stakeholders,rationalize the game relationship between stakeholders,buld a model of KMRW reputation game,use the Shapley value to determine income distributon, empirical assess the feasibility of the game model by case study and Participatory Rural Appraisal(PRA),explore income-sharing mechanism of rural homestead consolidation.Based on results of this study, scientific method and basis will be provided to strengthen land income management and form a reasonable allocation mechanism of rural homestead consolidation. At the same time, this study will provide substantial support for prtection land income of farmers, speeding up the modernization of agriculture development and enhancing the vitality of rural development.

农村宅基地整理对治理村庄"空心化"，提高土地利用效率有重要作用，然而，收益分配失衡已经成为当前农村宅基地整理中亟待解决的关键问题，博弈关系的分析有助于利益主体间形成合理的收益分配机制。本研究以博弈论为理论基础，以江苏农村宅基地整理试点区为研究对象，分析农村宅基地整理收益形成与分配现状，明确利益主体，梳理利益主体的博弈关系，构建利益主体间不完全信息动态博弈的KMRW声誉博弈模型，运用Shapley 值法测算博弈的收益分配，通过项目区案例分析和参与式农村调查（PRA）实证检验博弈模型的可行性，探讨农村宅基地整理收益分享机制。通过上述研究，可以为加强农村宅基地整理收益管理，形成合理的收益分配机制提供科学的方法和依据；同时，为保障农民土地收益，加快农业现代化发展和增强农村发展活力提供坚实的支撑。

农村宅基地整理对治理村庄“空心化”，提高土地利用效率有重要作用，然而， 收益分配失衡已经成为当前农村宅基地整理中亟待解决的关键问题，博弈关系的分析有助于 利益主体间形成合理的收益分配机制。本研究以博弈论为理论基础，以江苏农村宅基地整理 试点区为研究对象，分析农村宅基地整理收益形成与分配现状，明确利益主体，梳理利益主体的博弈关系，评价了农村宅基地整理的效果，构建了利益主体间不完全信息动态博弈的 KMRW 声誉博弈模型，运用 Shapley 值法测算博弈的收益分配，探讨农村宅基地整理收益分享机制。通过上述研究，可以为加强农村宅基地整理 收益管理，形成合理的收益分配机制提供科学的方法和依据；同时，为保障农民土地收益，加快农业现代化发展和增强农村发展活力提供坚实的支撑。