资金约束零售商促销下供应链的协调研究

The retailer's financial constraints and promotional efforts will exert an important influence on coordination mechanism of the supply chain. In shortage of funds, the retailer's inventory strategy interacts with promotion strategy, and as well financing strategy, which raises higher requirements for the supply chain coordination. However, the existing operations management literature that is investigated under capital constraints pay no attention to the issues as follows: joint optimization on financing, inventory and promotion effort of the retailer, and coordination of the supply chain. On implicit assumption of sufficient operational funds, the applicant and his collaborators studied the supply chain coordination with a retailer exerting promotional effort. The scientific research project will explore the issues mentioned above under capital constraints and with the hypothesis of “financing inventory but no financing promotion”. At first, it will discuss the joint decision problem on financing, inventory and promotion of the retailer, and make comparison of the retailer’s optimal strategies in case of between internal financing and external financing. Then, the supply chain coordination contract is investigated with the retailer exerting promotion efforts, in the two cases as follows, the effort can be confirmed and cannot be confirmed. Lastly, it analyzes the impact of conformity of the promotional effort, from the perspective of capital constraints, on supply chain coordination, to reveal joint influence mechanism of financial constraints and promotion efforts on contract coordination. This research can provide theoretical support for operation management of the firm confronted with shortage of funds and for the supply chain contracting on the practical level.

零售商的资金约束和促销努力均会对供应链的协调机制施加重要影响。在资金短缺下，零售商的库存、促销和融资策略交互影响，对供应链的协调提出了更高的要求。现有探讨资金约束下的运营管理文献没有考虑零售商关于融资、库存和促销的协同决策问题及其供应链的协调问题。申请人及其合作者探讨了零售商促销下的供应链协调问题，但相关研究是在运营资金充足下进行的。本课题将在资金不足下讨论上述问题，并基于“可对库存融资但不对促销融资”假设进行研究。首先，讨论零售商的融资、库存和促销协同决策问题以及有关内外部融资模式的选择问题；然后，针对零售商的促销努力可证实和不可证实两种情形，分别设计供应链的协调契约；最后，从资金约束的视角分析促销努力的可证实性对供应链协调的影响，力图揭示资金约束和促销努力对契约协调的联合影响机理。本项目的研究可为资金约束企业的运营管理及其供应链的签约管理提供理论支撑。

零售商的资金状况、风险偏好和促销努力都会对供应链的协调机制施加重要影响。在资金短缺下，零售商的库存、促销和融资策略交互影响，对供应链的协调提出了更高的要求。本项目在运营资金不足下讨论零售商关于融资、库存和促销的协同决策问题及其供应链的协调问题，并基于“可对库存融资但不对促销融资”假设进行研究，得到以下结论。第一，零售商是否选择对外融资依赖于初始资金和融资利率；零售商是否实施促销活动依赖于可支配资金（初始资金和融资资金）的大小。随着风险规避程度的增加，有关促销和融资的资金临界值减小，商品采购资金及融资金额随之降低。第二，在资金短缺下，收益共享契约和回购契约的等价性不再成立。在运营资金相对充裕下，收益共享契约不仅能协调供应链，且能实现渠道收益的任意分配，但回购契约不能实现渠道收益的任意分配，除非运营资金非常充裕。第三，在零售商促销下，若延后结算促销成本，仅当初始资金大于集中决策对应的最优促销费用时，供应链的协调才可实现；若及时结算促销成本，则不管资金稀缺度如何，始终存在契约机制能协调供应链。第四，初始资金不影响契约参数的关系，但影响协调契约的可行域；风险规避对协调契约的可行域及参数之间的函数关系都有重要影响。研究中提出了资金稀缺度的概念，在资金短缺背景下刻画了零售商促销的资金临界条件，并根据契约的有效性和柔性将契约划分为完全协调契约、部分（条件）协调契约和非协调契约，可为后续研究提供理论借鉴。