风险规避供应链促销下的契约协调研究

In a supply chain with a supplier and a retailer, the retailer's risk preference, as well as promotions and pricing decisions, will affect its ordering policy and therefore impose impact on contract coordination of the supply chain. There is little literature that discusses contract coordination with risk aversion and promotional efforts of the retailer, especially when promotional efforts cannot be confirmed. To the best of our knowledge, no literature studies comprehensive impact of the three factors on contract coordination. This project investigates the issues based on the CVaR risk criterion. First of all, it examines whether there exists contracts which can achieve coordination of the supply chain with a risk-averse retailer exerting sales effort, in the two cases where the promotional efforts can be confirmed and cannot be confirmed, respectively. Furthermore, it discusses the impact of risk aversion and sales effort on the supply chain coordination via contracts. Next, it extends the analysis to the circumstances in which the retailer has the power of pricing, and examines impact of the three factors including the retailer's risk aversion, promotions and pricing on the contracts that can achieve the supply chain coordination. Last but not least, the situation in which the supplier also exerts promotional efforts is considered, with focusing on discussion about what contracts can make the supply chain system to achieve optimal or sub-optimal when the promotional efforts of both the supplier and the retailer are not confirmed. The project not only practically provides decision-making basis for promotions, pricing, and contracting practices in the supply chain, but also theoretically enriches and sophisticates the research on supply chain contract coordination.

在由供应商和销售商组成的供应链中，销售商的风险偏好、促销以及定价行为这三个因素都将影响其订购决策，从而对供应链契约的可协调性施加影响。很少有文献同时考察风险规避和促销努力对契约协调的综合影响，尤其是当促销努力不可证实时，更没有文献同时分析三者共同作用下的契约协调问题。本项目运用CVaR方法研究这一问题。首先，在促销努力可证实和不可证实两种情形下，研究风险规避销售商促销下的契约协调机制，分析风险规避和促销努力对契约协调的影响。接下来，将前面的分析拓展到销售商拥有定价权的情形，进一步考察风险规避、促销和定价三重因素对契约的综合影响。最后，考察供应商也实施促销努力的情形，并重点讨论在双方的促销努力均不可证实下，如何构建能使供应链系统实现最优或次优状态的契约机制。项目研究不仅为供应链促销、定价以及契约实践提供决策依据，也从理论上丰富并完善供应链契约协调机制的研究。

在前期研究中，我们运用CVaR方法探讨了风险厌恶的销售商促销下供应链的契约协调问题，结果表明：存在一个风险厌恶的临界值，当销售商风险厌恶程度低于这个临界值时，借助成本分担机制，收益共享和回购契约均能协调供应链。.本项目从四个方向对上述研究进行了拓展：一是从促销努力可证实的情形拓展到不可证实的情形，二是从销售商促销拓展到渠道联合促销，三是从销售商不过于厌恶风险到极其厌恶风险，四是从销售商促销到销售商促销并定价。.研究得到以下结论，第一，在只有销售商促销下，如果促销努力不可证实，借助数量折扣机制，收益共享和回购契约仍能协调供应链。第二，在渠道联合促销下，如果促销努力可证实，通过相互分担对方的促销成本，收益共享和回购契约可协调供应链；如果促销努力不可证实，除非两种例外情形，否则供应链的协调不可实现。第三，如果销售商极其厌恶风险，等价回购契约或收益共享的寄售契约可协调供应链。第四，如果销售商促销且定价，借助价格转售维持或固定转移支付机制，回购契约或收益共享契约可协调供应链。特别地，在销售商促销或渠道联合促销下，收益共享和回购契约仍具有等价性（在以下意义上：两个契约均能协调供应链，且能完成相同的利益分配），但在销售商促销且定价下，收益共享和回购契约的等价性不再成立。.在项目研究中，发展了有关促销依赖下的一般需求模型，并将需求函数的递增价格弹性概念进行了拓展；提出了有助于简化理论分析的促销成本函数假设；并创造性地运用递归分析技术发展了求解所有契约参数的方法。本项目的研究不仅具有重要的科学意义，也为供应链的运营管理实践提供了理论借鉴和管理启示。