薪酬管制降低了经理人的努力水平吗?——基于多重参照点效应的作用机制研究

Compensation regulation is a realistic choice that western governments made after the subprime mortgage crisis to improve economic environment and a major policy that our government made at this stage to promote economic development and social equity, which also arouse people’s worry about the slowdown of executives’ effort provision. The past studies on the effects of compensation regulation were single, and lack of systematic theoretical framework to reveal its mechanism from the perspective of psychology and behavior. Executives’ effort provision belongs to the uncertain individual risk decision-making under the disturbance factors, influenced by the relative pay in addition to its own absolute salary, and relative pay depends on the reference point. The existing research on reference point’s effect concentrates more on a single point of reference, and the research on the effects of multiple reference points is of shortage. This study firstly establishes effect mechanism from reference point’s effect to reveal compensation regulation’s impact on decision-making and psychological cognition; secondly it will prove innovatively the common effects and internal mechanism of multiple reference points including the expectation reference point, horizontal reference point and status quo reference. The research will make up for the equity theory in the reference object selection rules from the theoretical level and enrich the research on effects of multiple reference points as well as on incentive theory and behavioral decision theory. In practice, it explains the doubts of the people. At the same time, the discovery of the laws of science will also improve the accuracy of the prediction of the behavior of the individual in order to guide compensation regulation policy-making by providing a theoretical basis.

薪酬管制是“次贷”危机后西方政府经济治理的现实选择，也是我国政府现阶段促进经济发展和社会公平的重大制度安排。舆论存在对经理人就此“消极怠工”——降低努力水平的担忧。以往研究对薪酬管制效果评价较为单一，缺乏从心理与行为视角揭示其作用机制的系统理论框架。经理人努力水平的选择属于不确定因素干扰下的个体风险决策问题，受到绝对薪酬外的相对薪酬影响，相对薪酬的高低取决于参照点。现有参照点效应的研究多集中于单一参照点，多重参照点效应研究较匮乏。本课题研究基于参照点效应，揭示薪酬管制对行为决策与心理认知产生影响的作用机制；拟创新性验证包括预期、水平和现状参照点的多重参照点共同作用的效果与内在机理。研究力求从理论层面弥补公平理论在参照点选择规律上的缺憾，充实多重参照点效应研究，丰富激励理论与行为决策理论。实践层面，解释疑虑，科学规律的发现还将提高个体行为预测的准确性，为薪酬管制政策制定提供理论依据。

薪酬管制是“次贷”危机后西方政府经济治理的现实选择，也是我国政府现阶段促进经济发展和社会公平的重大制度安排。舆论存在对经理人就此“消极怠工”——降低努力水平的担忧。经理人努力水平的选择属于不确定因素干扰下的个体风险决策问题，受到绝对薪酬之外的相对薪酬影响，相对薪酬的高低取决于参照点。本课题应用模拟情境实验、行为博弈实验以及实证研究的方法，基于参照点效应揭示了薪酬管制对个体行为决策与心理认知产生影响的作用机制。理论层面：1.基于我国文化背景，构建了经理人薪酬参照点五维结构模型；2.验证了参照点对薪酬满意度的影响及损失厌恶的调节作用：薪酬满意度存在参照点效应；参照点之上，个体的薪酬满意度表现为“收益”，反之为“损失”；个体的薪酬满意度呈现损失厌恶特征，同等程度的“损失”比同等程度的“收益”对个体的薪酬满意度影响更大；薪酬水平低于参照点时，损失厌恶调节薪酬满意度的参照点效应；3.揭示了参照点对薪酬公平感知的影响及不平等厌恶的调节作用：薪酬公平感知存在参照点效应；参照点之下，个体的薪酬公平感知表现为“损失”；现状、水平参照点之上，个体的薪酬公平感知表现为“收益”而非“有利损失”，预期参照点之上，薪酬公平感知相较于等于预期参照点时变化不大，略呈“有利损失”表象；个体的薪酬公平感知呈现损失厌恶特征；存在水平参照点情况下，优势不平等厌恶偏好调节个体薪酬公平感知的参照点效应；相对于劣势不平等厌恶系数，利用优势不平等厌恶系数区分被试偏好的异质性具有更多的经验数据支持；4.实证检验了高管薪酬横向水平参照对经理人努力水平的代理变量—企业绩效的影响：A股上市公司的每股收益显著受到同行业、同地区以及同产权性质企业高管薪酬参照的影响；同行业、同产权性质薪酬参照点对企业的总资产收益率具有明显的正向影响；5.发现了薪酬管制程度对高管薪酬参照与企业绩效间关系的调节作用。实践层面：研究结果对于评价薪酬管制政策效果，科学运用薪酬管制调控手段及薪酬激励政策提升经理人努力水平，制定与企业发展战略相匹配的薪酬策略具有重要参考价值。