重大工程供应商培育契约与激励机制研究

Resource supply in mega construction project has some significant characteristics such as large supply amount and high quality requirements. Focusing on the core problems including capacity and quality improvement in supplier development practices of mega construction projects, several scientific problems will be investigated based on supply chain management, decision theory, game theory and mechanism design. .1) The driving factors and barriers of supplier development will be empirically analyzed and a decision and operating process model that describes the decision process associated with a supplier development program will be built; .2) Considering the capacity and quality improvement costs and its phenomenon of countervailing incentives, contracts including capacity and quality improvement level will be designed to motivate the supplier to improve capacity and quality simultaneously;.3) Considering the asymmetry among suppliers, capacity and quality competition and cooperation model among the suppliers and capacity and quality incentive model between the owner and the suppliers based on game theory will be built, the differentiated incentive mechanisms for capacity improvement and the total quality improvement of the whole suppliers will be designed; .4) Considering the impact of quality defects on construction progress and the moral hazard brought by quality information asymmetry, quality defects and moral hazard prevention and incentive mechanisms by combining the quality control and incentive mechanisms will be studied based on the relationship between resource supply with the project network planning. .The research project aims to study the supplier development and its contract and incentive mechanisms problems from the strategic, tactical and operational levels and try to provide a scientific basis and theoretical guidance for supplier development practice in mega-construction projects in China.

针对重大工程资源供应量大、质量要求高等特点，围绕供应商培育实践中产能与质量提升的核心问题，运用供应链管理、决策理论和博弈论与机制设计等理论与方法，研究如下科学问题：实证分析供应商培育的驱动和阻滞因素，建立供应商培育决策与运作过程模型；综合考虑供应商产能与质量提升成本及其补偿激励现象，设计包含产能与质量提升水平的多属性契约；考虑供应商之间差异性，建立供应商之间产能与质量竞争合作的多阶段博弈模型、以及业主与供应商之间产能与质量激励的博弈模型，设计差异化的激励机制，促进供应商产能与整体质量提升；考虑资源供应与工程网络计划之间的关联关系，针对质量缺陷对工程进度的影响以及质量信息不对称带来的道德风险问题，将过程质量控制与激励机制结合，研究质量缺陷与道德风险的防范与激励机制。本课题从战略、战术和运作三个层面分析和研究供应商培育及其契约与激励机制问题，为我国重大工程供应商培育实践提供科学依据和理论指导。

针对重大工程资源供应量大、质量要求高等特点，围绕供应商培育实践中产能与质量提升的核心问题，实证研究与理论研究相结合，对重大工程供应商培育契约与激励机制展开研究：.1)调研与分析港珠澳大桥钢箱梁供应商培育实践等典型案例，对供应商培育的影响因素，包括供应商竞争力、供应商选择、协同合作以及激励手段等进行实证分析，其中实施过程中协同合作、供应商选中协商沟通是影响供应商培育成功的最关键两个方面，在此基础上建立了供应商培育决策与运作过程模型；.2)综合考虑供应商生产成本与产能水平和质量水平的关系，即生产成本结构，针对不对称信息下供应商培育的多属性最优契约进行求解分析，结果表明最优契约取决于产能与质量之间的互补或者替代关系，给出了互补与替代关系的单调条件及其相应的最优契约，并解释了补偿激励现象；.3)针对重大工程典型的供应商分工合作情形，提出了最低质量、质量加权和、质量乘积等三种整体质量评价模型，综合考虑成本分担、采购价格补贴和整体质量贡献激励等激励方式，对多供应商质量培育的激励机制进行研究，分析了不同激励方法对供应商质量提升的影响规律；进一步考虑供应商在未来市场以质量-价格形式的竞争，提出多阶段博弈模型，分析了业主激励对供应商在未来市场质量水平的影响规律；.4)研究了多工程供应商的质量检查策略问题，分析了业主激励(惩罚)、供应商成本结构对供应商质量水平、质量检查策略的影响规律；分别针对供应商质量缺陷是否处于工程网络计划中关键链和非关键链两种情况，研究了考虑工期的质量检查激励机制，通过调整外部损失分担比例和单位赔偿价格实现在关键链中的最优产品质量水平与非关键链中的最优产品质量水平相同。.本课题综合考虑质量、产能、工期、成本等核心要素及其关联关系，针对供应商培育契约与激励机制问题进行了深入研究，在总结重大工程供应商培育实践经验的基础上，揭示其内在运作机理，为重大工程供应商培育实践提供了科学依据和理论指导。