不对称信息电力市场激励性监管机制研究

At present,electric power system reform is going on in China,how to implement the management of power market, maintain the order of electric power market and the interests of the investors, operators and consumers, and exploring the incentive regulation mechanism of electric power market are the issues that are needed to be solved urgently in the current China’s electric power market management. This proposal, (1) applies the evidence theory to establish the obtaining, quantitative expression, measurement and inference rules for asymmetry information of power market regulator and the different regulated;(2) employs incentive theory method to design the incentive regulation mechanism on the market behavior and trading mechanism in the competitive segment (generation and retail), and the incentive regulation model on the transmission and distribution price and service quality in monopoly segment (transmission and distribution);(3) adopts game theory method to study the behavior strategy model of the different regulated under the given incentive regulation mechanisms;(4) creates swarm intelligence algorithm to form the solution technology of the incentive regulation models;(5) uses system engineering method to integrate all sorts of model and algorithm, forming the incentive regulation mechanism of electric power market under asymmetric information. These studies will form the incentive regulation mechanism theory method system of electric power market under asymmetric information, lay a theoretical foundation for perfecting our country’s electric power market management, provide specific methods, mathematical model and algorithm for government regulation, provide decision support for the players’ behavior strategies.

当前，我国电力体制改革正在进行，如何实施电力市场管理，维护电力市场秩序和电力投资者、经营者、消费者的利益，探讨电力市场激励性监管机制，是当前我国电力市场管理中迫切需要解决的问题。本项目，（1）运用证据理论建立电力市场监管者和被监管者的不对称信息的获取、定量表示、度量及推断规则；（2）用激励理论方法建立竞争性环节（发电、售电）的市场行为和交易机制的激励性监管机制及垄断环节（输配电）的输配电价格及输配电服务质量的激励性管制模型；（3）用博弈论方法研究被监管者在给定的激励性监管机制下的行为策略模型；（4）构造群体智能算法研究激励性监管模型的求解技术；（5）用系统工程方法集成各种模型与算法，形成不对称信息电力市场激励性监管机制。这些研究将形成不对称信息电力市场激励性监管机制理论方法体系，为完善我国电力市场管理奠定理论方法基础，为政府监管提供具体方法、数学模型与算法，为各主体的行为策略提供决策支持。

本项目以我国能源革命和电力市场化改革为背景，以维护社会公共利益、保障电力市场有序运行和优化电力配置资源为目标，以不对称信息下电力市场激励性监管所面临的“逆向选择”和“道德风险”问题为主线，探讨在电力市场化改革过程中的电力供需机理、电力市场不对称信息问题研究、竞争性电力市场环境下对垄断性环节、竞争性环节和外部性影响的激励性监管机制、以及多主体策略互动优化分析。.项目研究成果已发表（不包括待发表）论文22篇，主要发表在《Omega》、《Applied Energy》、《Energy Policy》、《Renewable & Sustainable Energy Reviews》以及《系统工程理论与实践》等国内外权威期刊上；待出版专著1部；成果分别获第十二届湖北省社会科学优秀成果奖二等奖（排名第一）和三等奖（排名第三）；完成政策研究报告3份，政策建议2份，10余份研究成果被政府部门或企业采用并取得效益；项目主持人先后获得国家杰出青年科学基金资助和国家社科基金重大项目资助，并晋升为三级教授、二级教授，培养博士后1名，博士研究生13名，硕士研究生17名。与宾西法尼亚州立大学Kleit N. Andrew教授等建立了合作关系，主办国际国内学术会议各1次，出席并做报告的国际国内学术会议30余人次。