中国地方政府绩效信息失真：评估、诊断与应对

Information inaccuracy is a common problem in performance measurement, and a main contributing factor is gaming or cheating behavior of the assessed subject. Deliberate inaccuracy （information distortion） has negative impact on expected goals of performance measurement, such as reinforcing accountability, optimization of resource allocation and improvement of internal management. Gaming behavior and the causes behind gaming thus have been an important research topic in performance measurement in the international circles. Information inaccuracy has also perplexed China for years and gaming practices are more wide-spread and more serious in some regions or fields. However, systematic study of gaming and its causes is a weak link in China. . The first major task of the proposed project is to do a systematic assessment of the information inaccuracy in China in government performance measurement. By referring to the literature overseas while paying due attention to the Chinese context, we have put forward an assessment framework for information inaccuracy with multiple dimensions and specific indicators. Delphi Technique and AHP will be used to refine the framework. Then a systematic study on information inaccuracy in China will be conducted based on the framework, using both subjective and objective measures. Subjective assessment is social perception of information inaccuracy in government performance measurement, including its pervasiveness and seriousness, the functional area or public service where information inaccuracy is most salient. Considering the inherent limitations of subjective assessment, objective assessment is also adopted as a supplement. We will select a limited number of functional areas or public services where performance information is regarded as most unreliable in our questionnaire survey, possibly GDP growth rate and performance data on environment protection. Specific assessment framework will be set up for each area, including dimensions and indicators. Then we will search for a large quantity of subjective evidence and data, and use suitable models and tools to do quantitative analysis, leading to subjective assessment of information inaccuracy in the area.. The second major task is to explore the causes or motivation of gaming in the China. By referring to the literature overseas we have put forward an analytical framework, including 5 headline factors (e.g. social norms, task difficulty, external supervision) and about 20 sub-factors. The sub-factors are designed to reflect special Chinese contexts. Delphi Technique and AHP will be used to refine the framework. Then a systematic study on the causes of gaming in China will be conducted based on the framework, again using both subjective and objective measures. Subjective measures here are mainly sequencing of the headline factors as well as sub-factors leading to gaming in our large-scale survey plus necessary correlation analysis. Objective analysis will take the findings of information inaccuracy in selected specific area as dependent variables, and the headline factors and sub-factors as independent variables, and use tools such as regression analysis, correlation analysis, and factor analysis to establish relative importance of independent variables. . The final task or the foothold of the research is twofold. One is to provide theoretical explanations to the salient divergences between China and other countries concerning the level and form of information inaccuracy and driving force behind gaming. Another it to put forward recommendations to ensure the quality of performance information, particularly concrete measures against gaming or cheating in China.

中国政府绩效评估的公信力受到质疑的重要原因之一是信息失真。因此，立足国情探讨绩效信息质量的保障措施是实践的迫切需要。首先，依据构建的信息失真考察框架对中国情况做系统考察，包括基于问卷调查的信息失真主观评价（社会感知）和基于特定领域数据定量分析的客观评价。其次，聚焦导致信息失真的弄虚作假行为（博弈行为），重点研究博弈致因。前期研究构建了包括5个一级因素和20个二级因素的博弈致因分析框架，拟运用德尔菲法完善框架并操作化。在此基础上针对公务员进行问卷调查，确定具有普遍性的博弈致因要素。同时，考虑客观数据的可及性，选择信息失真比较严重的一到两个领域，综合运用焦点群体访谈和客观数据建模分析方法，探讨博弈致因诸要素和信息失真之间的关系强度和作用机理。最后，基于政府绩效信息失真状况考察的主要发现和博弈致因分析的重点结论，借鉴发达国家的经验，提出博弈行为防范的政策建议，包括宏观制度规范和可操作的技术措施。

从党的十七大提出“推行政府绩效管理”，到十八大要求“严格绩效管理”，绩效管理成为国家治理体系和治理能力现代化的重要举措。而绩效信息失真是实践中存在的突出问题，不仅严重影响绩效管理效用，而且对政府公信力造成损害。本课题立足于中国国情，探讨政府绩效信息失真和博弈致因，并提出绩效信息质量保障体系和博弈防范的政策建议，主要研究成果集中体现在以下五方面：（1）相关文献与基础理论分析。系统梳理了政府绩效管理的学术关注度和政府绩效信息、公共组织绩效考核的政治性研究等相关文献，以及系统分析了信息质量标准、复杂性治理和绩效评估中机会主义、员工偏差行为等相关理论。同时，构建了博弈致因分析框架和旅游业信息失真评价的理论框架。（2）相关文本分析。在基础理论分析的基础上，展开了两项文本计量分析：一是聚焦环保信息质量、二是围绕环境信息质量保障制度，对中央政府出台的相关法规政策进行文本量化分析。（3）实证与案例研究。实证分析及包括我国政府绩效信息失真的系统性考察，又聚焦扶贫信息领域以及GDP数据领域对政府绩效信息失真展开系统的分析和讨论。案例研究包括对地方政府的统计公信力、统计信用与统计公信力的关系和基层政府“双线”考评机制进行系统研究。（4）国外经验研究。从组织保障机制、信息质量标准、信息资源管理机制和不当信息修正机制四个方面，梳理总结美国政府信息质量保障机制的整体图景。（5）其他相关领域研究。以员工工作幸福感为指向，运用工作焦虑理论探讨道德领导对员工工作幸福感的影响因素。在本课题的资助下，已发表的学术论文有12篇。指导完成硕士论文2篇，本科论文6篇。拟发表的论文有3篇。本课题在现状考察和致因分析研究基础上，结合国际先进经验提出保障信息质量的制度规范和可操作性措施，对严格绩效管理充分发挥其效能具有积极意义。