官员人事管理和国家治理能力研究：基于激励、遴选和组织结构的视角

Political selection and the personnel management for public officials are a fundamental factor of state apparatus and governing capability. Drawing upon China’s unique institutional setting and theoretical models in organizational economics, this project aims to systematically examine the relationship between personnel management and the governing capability of state from three theoretical perspectives: incentive, selection, and organizational structure. We understand the career path and educational background of public officials as a kind of political human capital, which structures political incentive, personal capability and policy preference, and the organizational capacity of government. Building on an in-depth data set on the biographic information of nearly 5,000 government officials governing city, province, and ministerial positions, the project plans to study six specific research questions: (1) how the age structure affected the political incentive to enhance a healthy business environment, (2) how the peer effects due to relative performance evaluation interacted with policies on industrial upgrading, (3) how the political incentive of officials is shaped by the long term career path, (4) how city leaders with high variety of work experiences mattered for the structure and efficiency of public expenditure, (5) how female leaders matter for policies and performance on public goods provision, and (6) how the organization structure of political human capital affected the stability of public policies. These projects will employ an array of formal and quantitative methods, such as contract theory, structural model, spatial econometric, network analysis, and machine learning, to study the mechanisms between the system of personnel management for public officials and government capability and performance. The project expects to produce 6-7 high-quality papers and organize several international conference and workshops to discuss the research agendas on the implications of the researches for comparative political selection and state capability.

官员选拔和人事管理是国家治理体系的重要组成部分，也是实现国家治理能力现代化的保证。本项目结合中国特有的制度背景和组织经济学的一般理论，把官员的履历背景理解为一种政治人力资本，从激励、遴选和组织结构三重理论视角研究官员人事管理体制和国家治理能力的关系。项目建立了包含近5千名当代地市级地方官员和部委、厅、局官员完整履历的数据库，将围绕年龄结构与营商环境、同侪效应与产业转型升级、官员培养与政治激励、调动模式与公共支出效率、女性官员与治理绩效、人力资本组织结构与政策连续性等6个子课题进行理论建模和实证分析，从组织经济学的微观逻辑出发研究人事管理体制与经济发展和治理绩效之间的关系。项目将利用结构模型、空间计量模型、网络分析和大数据研究等现代科学工具，研究、发表6-7篇具有国际学术前沿水平的中英文论文，并在研究成果基础上推动当代官员选拔与治理模式研究议程与国际学术界的对话。

官员选拔和人事管理是政府治理体系的重要组成部分，也是实现国家治理能力现代化的基础。本项目立足于中国制度背景和政策实践，结合组织经济学和官僚科层政治的前沿理论，在前期研究、文献总结、数据分析、案例研究的基础上，总结了官员人事管理体制中影响官员治理绩效和政策选择的一般规律。构建了包含地方到中央政府4,743名高级别官员的详细任职履历的当代官员数据库，并结合地方政府工作报告，通过机器学习方法识别各地方政府规划的核心产业和重点产业，建立覆盖全国284个地级市从1993年到2018年间的地级市-年-行业为观测单位的产业政策数据库。在此基础上，项目围绕地方政府治理的多任务模式和卫生城市的评比表彰，公共政策的创新和扩散机制，官员政治人力资本的内生机制，官员调动模式与经济发展和长期治理绩效的关系，女性官员的治理风格与治理绩效，官员网络与治理绩效等专题开展了一系列研究。项目通过数据构建和实证研究为当代官员人事管理体制的规律和特征提供了一个全景式的认识，提出了当代中国官员管理体制的“激励、选拔、培养、调动”模型。以经济增长、税收监管、环境绩效、卫生城市、创业投资等一些具体发展和治理问题的研究为抓手，从理论机制和制度设计层面分析了中国官员人事管理体制和地方政府治理中的多任务模式、政策扩散、官员治理风格、决策权分配等理论问题，形成了包含官员激励、选拔、调动、培养和网络化等机制的理论框架。项目在研究过程中完成中英文论文等各项成果二十余篇，在中英文权威学术期刊发表论文十余篇，并把基于中国官员人事管理的研究思路推广到跨国研究和历史研究中，通过当代中国的国家治理经验与国际实践的比较，揭示了中国国家治理体制的特有优势，按计划完成了研究目标。