控制权配置、审计监督与国企高管自利行为

Based on the perspective of control rights allocation and power rent-seeking, this research project will focus on the self-serving phenomenon of the state-owned enterprises’ executives, in order to reveal the influential effect as well as the intrinsic mechanism of SOEs’ internal power allocation, the external audit supervision and their interactions on executives’ self-serving behavior and corporate value. Through theoretical models and empirical tests, our study mainly analyses three key issues: (1) Is there an inevitable link between the characteristic of control rights and enterprises’ self-serving behavior? (2) Will the governance factors such as independent audit affect the behavior of executives’ self-serving behavior? (3) What is the implementation mechanism of SOEs’ internal power allocation, external audit supervision and their interactions affecting executives’ self-serving behavior and corporate value? This project is not only of great significance to the understanding of self-serving behavior’s key factors, generating mechanism and its consequences, but also a good supplement and extension of the managerial power theory proposed by Bebchuk et al. (2002) in the level of corporation’s financial decision-making. Furthermore, the results of this research can offer some necessary references and policy enlightenments to the SOEs’ governance practice such as optimizing the internal power configuration, restraining executives’ self-serving behavior and strengthening the protection of small and medium-sized investors as well.

本项目聚焦于国企高管的自利现象，着力从控制权配置与权力寻租视角出发，揭示国企内部权力配置、外部审计监督及其交互作用对高管自利行为和企业价值的影响效应与内在机理。通过理论模型与实证检验，重点回答以下三个关键问题：（1）国企高管的控制权特征与其自利行为之间是否存在必然的内在联系？（2）国企面临的独立审计等治理因素是否影响了高管的权力自利行为？（3）控制权配置、审计监督及其交互作用对高管自利和企业价值影响的实现机理是什么？本项目的研究不但有助于深刻理解国企高管权力自利的关键影响因素、作用机理及其经济后果，为学术界在高管自利领域的研究提供增量贡献，而且是对“高管权力论”（Managerial Power Theory）在企业财务决策层面进行的有益补充和拓展，并且能够为优化企业内部权力配置、规范和约束高管自利行为、加强资本市场中小投资者保护等治理实践提供理论借鉴和政策启示。

本项目关注经济社会转型期我国国企高管的自利问题，着重从企业内部控制权配置和外部审计监督两方面揭示高管自利行为的关键影响因素、作用机理及其经济后果。. 基于此，课题组开展了如下研究工作：（1）对自建数据库进行了持续补充和完善；（2）研究了控制权配置对高管具体自利行为的影响机制以及关系型交易等因素的调节效应；（3）考察了审计监督机制抑制高管自利行为的作用效果；（4）探索了与课题计划相关联的一些拓展性主题；（5）结合研究成果总结和提炼了相关政策建议。. 本研究的主要发现包括：（1）控制权配置的增强不但会提高高管的自利性避税程度，强权高管还会进一步恶化自利行为对企业价值的负面影响；（2）控制权配置的增强会降低高管因业绩低劣而被强制性更换的可能性，强权高管被变更后公司业绩并没有得到改进，而政府控制层级的提升和制度环境的改善能够抑制国企高管的上述权力寻租行为；（3）控制权配置的增强会强化关系型交易与高管自利性避税行为的正向关系，而当公司面临更强的市场竞争压力和拥有较低的多元化程度时，关系型交易对高管自利性避税行为的促进作用更为显著，不过控制权配置原有的正向调节效应却受到明显弱化；（4）女性高管的比例提升能够降低高管选择自利性避税行为，不过女性高管这一治理作用会因控制权配置的增强而弱化；（5）高管的政治晋升动机会弱化金字塔控制模式对自利性避税的正向影响，揭示高管的政治晋升锦标赛对企业经营效率发挥了潜在的负面效应；（6）强制内部控制审计能够有效遏制高管自利行为，不过以“大所”为代表的高质量外部审计的治理效应呈现出相对迥异的异质性特征。. 上述研究结果不但是对“高管权力论”（Managerial Power Theory）增添了来自中国的经验佐证，也是对有关审计师特征如何影响高管行为的研究在我国新兴加转轨制度背景下的有益拓展，并且为当前以优化权力配置、加强财务决策监督为导向的公司治理改革提供了重要的借鉴意义。