专利质量治理政策体系研究

Due to multiple factors, the world's major technological innovation country, including China, are facing increasingly serious patent quality problems. The way of solving these problems by theorists and practitioners was mostly to increase the human resources of the Patent Office. But they ignored the role which patent application and patent invalidation procedures can play in patent quality controlling，as well as the economic rationality of each participants，making those reforms did not achieve the desired effect. Regarding the issue above, this project attempts to construct a patent quality governance policy system that involves multiple links through the guidance of interests. Specifically, this project will adopt: R&D input-return model to study the economic rationality of R&D input decision makers; Case analysis to study the economic rationality of patent applicants; International comparative analysis to study the construction of patent examination quality management system; Questionnaire survey to study the economic rationality of patent challenger. And adopt: The logic regression model to study the effect of the patent applicant's interaction with the examiner on the quality of authorized patents; Game analysis and natural experiment research to study the coordination mechanism between patent examination and invalidation procedures. On the basis of fully exploring motivation and interaction mechanism of individual participants in all links, this project would construct a governance policy system that can achieve "self-organization" within the patent system, this will provide a new method to overcome the dilemma of patent quality in China and even in the world.

受多重因素影响，包括我国在内的全球主要技术创新大国都面临着日益严重的专利质量问题。理论界与实务界解决上述问题的思路多为增加专利审查单位的人力资源，却忽略了事前的专利申请与事后的专利无效环节能发挥的作用，及各环节中参与主体的经济理性，并没有取得预期的效果。基于此，本项目试图通过利益引导的方式，构建涉及多环节的专利质量治理政策体系。具体而言，本项目将通过：R&D投入—收益模型研究R&D投入决策者的经济理性；案例研究专利申请人的经济理性；国际比较分析研究审查质量管理体制的构建；问卷调查研究无效请求人的经济理性。并通过：Logic回归模型研究专利申请人与审查员互动对授权专利质量的影响机制；博弈分析和自然实验研究专利审查与无效程序的协同机制。在充分发掘各环节参与者利己性动因与交互机制的基础上，构建可以实现专利系统内部“自组织”的治理政策体系，为突破我国乃至全球专利质量困境提供一个新的思路。

在我国专利申请量与授权量与日俱增并位居世界前列的同时，我国专利质量的问题开始成为理论界与实务界关注的热点，这一问题如得不到妥善解决将严重影响专利制度对技术创新的激励效果。目前，我国理论界与实务界解决专利质量问题是通过单环节的质量管理思维，即通过行政手段调动资源以提高专利审查程序的效率，却忽略了事前的专利申请与事后的专利无效程序所能发挥的作用，以及各程序中参与主体的自主性，因此并没有取得预期的效果。在我国建设现代化国家治理体系的大背景下，本项目尝试构建了专利质量治理政策体系，该体系具有以下两个特点：第一，与管理思维不同，治理政策体系将在“经济人”假设的基础上，充分发掘各主体行为背后的利己性动因，并通过利益引导以实现专利系统“自组织”的方式来解决专利质量问题；第二，政策体系集合了事前专利申请环节、事中专利审查环节以及事后专利无效环节，是一个有机的整体。在事前治理方面，本项目研究了专利扩张的抑制机制；在事中治理方面，该项目研究了审查质量管理体系的国际比较，进一步探索了国际专利审查合作机制的选择决策；在事后治理方面，本项目研究了无效诉讼博弈对问题专利发掘的影响机制；根据系统中各环节之间的相互关系，本项目研究了专利审查和无效程序之间的协同机制。此外，作为延伸，该项目还研究了专利质量对高校专利转化的影响机制。