公众预期、前瞻指引与货币政策规则--基于实验经济学的研究

Based on special features of China's monetary policy, we will explore the monetary rule and communication strategy designs for effectively stabilizing the economy according to the evidences from laboratory experiments. By examining the behavior of the micro-individuals in the laboratory taking different roles or under different monetary policy regime, the abilities to stabilize the economy of the policy designs are tested. With the factors that reflect the characteristics of China's monetary policy, we will build models and design experiment from two dimensions. One is the inflation forecasting experiment in the repeated game between the central banker and the public. The other is the inflation forecasting experiment under the New Keynes frame. The former focuses on the combination of central bank choice between commitment or discretionary rule and partially transparent or partial publicity in information communication. The interaction mechanism between central bank and public will be analyzed. The latter focuses on the influences of distinct combinations of monetary policy rules and Forward-looking Guidance strategy on public expectation behavior. According to the experiment results and the conclusions of the mechanism analysis, some suggestions will be put forward on improving the monetary policy framework in China.

本课题拟运用实验经济学方法，结合我国货币政策特征，探究有效稳定经济的货币政策规则和央行与公众沟通策略。通过考察实验室中微观个体担任不同经济角色、在不同货币政策框架下的通胀预期行为，测试政策规则设计的效果。研究将加入反映我国货币政策特征的因素，从两个维度构建实验模型和设计实验，一是央行与公众博弈框架下的预期行为实验；二是新凯恩斯框架下的预期行为实验。前者侧重研究央行以承诺制或相机抉择决策、与部分信息透明或部分范围透明沟通的政策组合效果，分析央行行为与公众行为的相互影响机制；后者侧重研究不同货币政策反应规则和有无前瞻指引的政策搭配对公众预期行为的影响。根据实验结果和机制分析的结论，提出完善我国货币政策框架的建议。

本课题主要研究内容分为两大模块：结合我国货币政策特征，一是央行与公众博弈框架下的预期行为实验；二是新凯恩斯框架下的预期行为实验。前者侧重研究央行采取不同决策机制、不同沟通策略组合的政策效果，以及央行行为和公众行为的相互影响机制；后者侧重研究不同货币政策反应规则和有无前瞻指引的不同政策搭配对预期行为的影响。研究结果表明，第一，根据行为实验的证据可以得出，加入充分透明信息指引和相机抉择情形下，比承诺规则和有限程度、有限范围的信息指引的货币政策较为有效。这一结论可为我国前瞻指引策略和货币政策框架设计提供微观依据。第二，运用历史数据的实证研究表明，我国央行已实施的前瞻性指引货币政策有效性不足。第三，微观主体的预期会受到货币政策变动的显著影响。另外，还有部分研究成果尚未完善，未形成最终发表的成果。