共享经济下基于策略消费者与自由代理人的即时服务平台运营决策

With the prosperity of sharing economy and the tendency on on-demand service, a lot of on-demand service platforms appear in our daily life. An on-demand service platform is a double-sided platform, which connects consumers and agents. The platform charges a service price from the customers and pays a wage to the agents if an on-demand service is complete, and the difference between the price and the wage is the platform’s profit. On-demand service platform is a new business model in the spirit of sharing economy. On one side of the platform are the customers seeking for on-demand service, which are sensitive to the service delay. On the other side of the platform are the self-scheduled agents, who can freely decide whether to serve in the platform according to the expected earning rate. Regarding an on-demand service platform, the effective demand rate and the effective service rate are endogenously determined from the consumers’ behavior and the agents’ behavior, respectively. This is the key difference between an on-demand service platform and a typical one-sided business model. To investigate the effect of double-sided uncertainty on the operational decisions of the on-demand service platform, we propose this project regarding the operational study on the on-demand service platforms with strategic consumers and self-schedule agents. We will first investigate the pricing and cancellation strategy of one platform setting, and then go deeper to investigate the coopetition and competition models between two platforms. The four research questions proposed are closely related to the industry practices. We believe that the research outcome would help on-demand service platforms improve operational efficiency, provide the government suggestions to better regulate the new business phenomenon, and promote the scientific development of our country in the field of sharing economy..

随着共享经济繁荣发展、即时服务成为新的消费趋势，生活中涌现了大量即时服务平台。即时服务平台通过建立消费者与代理人的联系、收取服务价差实现盈利，是一种新的商业模式。平台一边是寻求即时服务的消费者，对服务延时敏感；平台另一边是可自主选择的代理人，根据收益率大小决定是否参与服务。因此，平台的服务需求、服务供应分别由消费者、代理人选择行为内生决定，与传统的单边运营有显著差异。为了探索即时服务平台在这种供需关系均不确定性下的运营决策，本项目拟以策略消费者与自由代理人为切入点，研究即时服务平台的运营决策。在研究内容上，我们首先分析单一平台的定价决策、订单取消策略，再拓展竞争环境，研究双平台在竞合、全竞争两种市场结构下的运营决策。本项目拟研究内容密切结合行业内实践需求，其研究成果能为即时服务平台提供管理建议，也能为政府优化社会福利、实施监管提供理论依据，促进我国共享经济领域的科学发展。

数字经济时代，即时服务是越来越热门的消费趋势。即时服务平台通过建立消费者与代理人的联系、收取服务价差实现盈利。平台一边是寻求即时服务的消费者，对服务延时敏感；平台另一边是可自主选择的代理人，根据收益率大小决定是否参与服务。平台的服务需求、服务供应分别由消费者、代理人选择行为内生决定，与传统的单边运营有显著差异。为了探索即时服务平台在这种供需关系均不确定性下的运营决策，本项目以策略消费者与自由代理人为切入点，研究即时服务平台的运营决策。在研究内容上，我们首先分析单一平台的定价决策、订单取消策略，再拓展竞争环境，研究双平台在竞合、全竞争两种市场结构下的运营决策。项目首先研究了即时服务平台中对服务延时敏感消费者的多维选择均衡。针对允许支付额外溢价来获取优先服务权利的服务系统，考虑同质策略消费者在优先服务、常规服务、以及外部选择三者之间的选择均衡，是一个二维的均衡决策。我们提出了一种分步分析的方法，发现消费者效用由三段单调曲线连接而成，进一步明确了二维均衡的存在点并判定其稳定性。针对即时服务平台的最优订单取消策略研究，项目通过刻画策略消费者在不同订单取消罚金策略下的下单与取消行为，自由代理人的机会成本损失。通过对比固定取消费用、按等待时间长短取消费用两种取消策略的优劣，为平台选择订单取消策略、政府监管提供了理论依据。针对消费者策略与自由代理人均可以自由选择加入两个平台或者外部选择的多维双边平台竞争模型，研究发现，如果平台以远视稳定集合的角度来决策，其双边结构可以帮助平台在竞争中极致压榨策略消费者剩余与自由代理人剩余，而在近视均衡解下无法实现这一目标。此外，平台的竞争未必有利于消费者但一定有利于自由代理人。该研究结果可以为即时服务平台积极面对同行竞争、为政府机构的合理监管提供有效的管理建议。