政策性农业保险对农户生产行为的影响机制及道德风险度量：基于生猪保险田野实验经济学的研究

Since 2004, our Central Government has paid great attention on policy oriented agricultural insurance, which is an important public sponsored risk management tool for farmers' to mitigate their production risks. Although livestock insurance is an important component of agricultural insurance, it has long been ignored, especially in micro level empirical studies, while most of the theoretical and empirical insurance literature focuses on field crops only. In this research, we take the approach of field experiments to conduct causality analysis between farmers' hog insurance participation and their production behavior, as well as to assess the moral hazard problem in hog insurance. We have designed a field experiment with a compulsory insurance in 2014 and an open voluntary insurance in 2015, a unique situation for comparison. Combined with 2010 to 2012 farmers' household survey data from our previous project, we will have a five year panel dataset. The separated compulsory insurance and voluntary hog insurance are compared to reveal the moral hazard effect, an important issue in insurance theory and practice. The goal of this project is to further develop microeconomic theory as a foundation of Chinese government sponsored livestock insurance system, and to offer policy advice to enhance the effect of agricultural insurance.

近年来，中央政府高度重视政策性农业保险这一农民管理生产风险、稳定收入的重要社会化风险管理工具。尽管养殖业保险也是农业保险的重要组成，但传统农业保险研究却多偏向于种植业，少有基于微观农户数据对养殖业保险深入实证分析的研究。本研究拟通过前沿的田野实验经济学手段，以生猪保险对农户生产行为的影响作为切入点，对生猪保险如何影响农户生产行为进行因果关系分析，并对生猪保险的道德风险进行量化研究。研究设计了2014 年强制保险的干预性试验，以及开放的2015 年农户自愿保险，并通过两次问卷跟踪调查，结合申请者前三年相同农户的跟踪调查，形成十分独特的五年面板数据。研究将对强制保险与自愿保险两组数据分别进行分析及对比，以此深入探索政策性农业保险的效率及道德风险等相关理论问题。本研究的重点在于对中国政策性农业保险（生猪保险）的微观基础理论进行深化和补充，并对政策性农业保险的福利效应进行量化分析。

申请人利用该项目对浙江、河南数千随机抽样农户进行连续3-5年入户跟踪调查，针对农业保险、食品安全以及公共卫生领域建立了国内最完善的微观数据库之一，并发表一系列学术论文；研究修正了农业保险传统理论，采取田野实验经济学方法识别政策性农业保险道德风险，为提高财政补贴效率，改进农业支持方式奠定了实证研究基础；研究提出利用农业保险作为降低抗生素耐药性的激励性管制政策，将农业保险的研究视野扩展到公共卫生以及食品安全领域，并依此设计激励性管制政策。研究得到中央政府相关决策机关高度重视。