经理人非财务业绩评价与企业创新研究：基于高管权力距离视角的分析

Non-financial performance measures (NFPM) in executive compensation contract evaluate executives’ efforts in innovation, product quality, and other areas related to firms’ long-term development. It can enhance the informativeness about dimensions of executives’ efforts; and in addition, by directing executives’ effort, the NFPM plays a big part in firms’ long-term development. The introduction and application of the NFPM for executives in China has not been long, but has been on the increase. It is vital to understand how the system has been used in the Chinese context, in order to promote the application of the NFPM for executives in Chinese firms. This project, therefore, investigates the NFPM for executive in Chinese publicly listed firms, particularly its usage, determinants and consequently impacts on firms’ innovation performance. The contribution of this project is twofold. Theoretically it enhances our understanding about the application of the NFPM for executives in the Chinese context. Empirically, results of this study can enrich practitioners’ understanding about factors that can hinder/promote the usage of the NFPM for executives, and how to enhance firm performance such as innovation by using the NFPM for executives. ..We first investigate the application of the NFPM for CEOs in Chinese public firms. Using manually collected data as well as survey data on executives’ NFPM, we study the main types of NFPM and weights placed on each non-financial performance measures. Second, we study the determinants of the application of the NFPM for CEOs in Chinese public firms. Based on characteristics of Chinese corporate governance, we propose to examine this question under a framework of top management power distance theory. The power distance theory refers to a distance in power between top management caused by their differences in social, economic and political status. It can affect communication and information flow between top management, thus affecting the design of performance measures for CEOs. We argue that the power distance between top management is particularly effective in Chinese firms given a strong authority culture in the country. We manually collect data on top management backgrounds to study how the power distance between chairman/chairman of compensation committee of corporate board and CEO would affect the application of the NFPM for CEOs. Lastly, we study under the power distance dynamics, how the NFPM for CEOs would affect firm innovation, including efficiency of innovation and style of innovation.

经理人非财务业绩评价考察经理人在创新等非财务方面的业绩；从监督与激励层面促进公司治理，对提高企业长期发展，特别是创新起关键性的作用。这一考核制度在我国企业实施时间不长，因此研究该制度的应用现状，决定因素，及其实施效果，特别是结合我国企业具体治理特征的研究，能丰富我们对这一制度的理解，也为促进该制度在企业的实施提供最新的研究经验。本项目结合我国具体的公司治理情境，从高管权力动态视角考察上市公司CEO非财务业绩评价的实施现状、决定因素、以及其实施效果。我们1）运用上市公司经理人业绩评价的手工整理数据和问卷调查数据，系统分析上市公司CEO非财务业绩评价指标的分类及其权重。2）运用手工整理的高管背景数据，考察中国上市公司高管权力距离如何影响CEO非财务业绩评价的应用。3）应用手工收集的企业创新业绩数据，考察在权力距离情境下，上市公司CEO非财务业绩评价如何影响企业的创新效率与创新风格。

本项目从高管权力距离视角出发，研究经理人非财务业绩评价的应用现状和应用效果；进一步我们基于高管权力距离理论分析企业内部治理的创新和其他重要经济后果。首先， 我们运用上市公司 CEO 业绩评价的手工整理数据， 系统分析 CEO 非财务业绩评价指标的分类与其在考核中的权重；我们发现2007~2018年间企业所使用的非财务指标的类型有明显增加，且非财务指标的类型更加细化，比如员工指标方面新增了具体的员工人均收入这一指标。但从指标占比来看，企业仍以财务评价指标为主。其次，高管权力指标与企业是否采用非财务业绩指标没有显著的相关性；反而企业会计信息质量、高管的所有权能显著影响企业是否采用非财务业绩考核指标。第三，一项新的业绩考核的制度实施往往受到组织既有制度环境、尤其是竞争性制度逻辑的影响。第四、非财务业绩指标能够为高管考核提供一部分替代性信息，从而降低了高管薪酬设计对财务信息的依赖度。第五、高管之间的权力距离在一定程度上可以使得高管之间相互制约，达到治理效果；具体体现为高管权力距离为基础的企业内部治理能够促进企业的创新投资但不能影响创新质量。第六、企业的外部治理环境，如控股股东的治理结构、政策或者会计准则的变化，能够显著影响企业的内部治理，从而调节高管的决策，影响企业的经济效益。.本项目的研究从高管权力距离视角丰富了企业内部治理、以及非财务业绩考试指标的研究，具有一定的理论贡献和实践意义。首先，本项目的研究有助于推动实务界更好地理解、完善企业内部治理、高管业绩考核与激励。其次，本项目关于政策和会计准则的变化与内部治理的研究为国家有关政策部门的政策制定提供相关经验研究证据和参考。最后，本项目关于高管业绩考核指标数据的收集和数据库的建立，有助于未来深入研究高管业绩考核与激励。