信贷扩张的财政逻辑与潜在风险：来自地方性银行和融资平台的证据

Theories of traditional fiscal decentralization and new fiscal centralization focus on the nexus between fiscal difficulties and tax administration, intergovernmental tax competition, and extra-budgetary revenues. However，the question considering how to cope with fiscal difficulties caused by fiscal and tax system reform by means of financial markets remains to be answered. For local governments, changes in income tax sharing rate and value-added tax sharing rate are exogenous shocks. This project aims to investigate these exogenous financial shocks’ impact on government-driven credit and demonstrate the inherent fiscal logic of credit expansion , i.e, the need of sharing local governments’ expenditure responsibilities and the incentive effect of fiscal decentralization in a unitary state. The debts of local financing platforms are implicit government debts since most loans and bonds raised for infrastructure construction are guaranteed by local governments. Thus, local governments should beware of cross-market financial risks’ contagion. This study makes the following main contributions. First，topics about the relationships between fiscal difficulties and credit expansion enrich Chinese-style decentralization theory. Second，the discussion of these issues have important practical significance for preventing systematic risks contagion and winning the battle against significant risk．

传统财政分权理论和新财政集权理论关注了财政压力对税收征管强度、政府间税收竞争、预算外收入等方面的影响，而鲜有文献研究地方政府如何借助金融市场利用隐性负债的融资方式应对财政压力。本研究利用2002年所得税分享改革、“营改增”结构性减税等财税体制改革的外生冲击来识别财政压力的地区差异。通过考察地方财力冲击及其对辖区内银行贷款的影响，从分担地方政府财政支出责任和单一制国家财政分权的内在激励这两个维度探究信贷扩张的财政逻辑。政府担保等因素使得地方融资平台公司等国有经济部门的负债构成了地方政府隐性负债，相关风险对金融风险的传染效应亦是一个需要重点关注的问题。通过剖析地方金融功能“类财政”化的内在逻辑及其潜在风险，研究成果将丰富中国式财政分权理论和金融分权理论，对于治理财政风险与金融风险交叉传染问题、打好防范化解重大风险的攻坚战也有一定参考价值。

地方政府债务风险管理不仅是构建现代预算制度建设的内在要求也是维护经济安全的重要任务。全面认识地方政府债务形成机理是推进地方融资平台市场化转型、防控地方政府债务风险的基础。本项目旨在从分担地方政府财政支出责任和单一制国家财政分权的内在激励这两个维度探究信贷扩张的财政逻辑。在地方政府信用扩张的形成机制方面，实证结果表明财政压力和金融分权显著促进了地方融资平台的债务扩张，且新《预算法》实施后该效应有所减弱。在地方政府信用风险防范与治理方面，研究发现：（1）转移支付显著抑制了地方政府在市政公共设施建设中的债务融资规模，这种抑制作用一方面来自地方政府融资渠道拓宽后的财力替代效应，另一方面来自中央财政的资金监督效应；（2）地方政府债券自主发行权限下放和发行量扩大对地方融资平台城投债的发行量具有抑制作用，进一步的作用机制检验表明发行地方政府债券能通过弱化地方政府税收和政府性基金征收激励来影响城投债发行量。