双积分政策下汽车制造商产量及积分处理决策研究

In order to promote the healthy development of the automobile industry, in September 2017 the Chinese government has issued the regulations entitled " parallel management measures of passenger car corporate average fuel consumption and new energy vehicle credit " , which is also named dual-credit policy. The policy replaces government subsidy policy and significantly changes the production and operation environment of automakers. Therefore, it is an important and realistic problem to study automakers’ optimal decisions under the new policy. However, the research on dual-credit policy is rather limited. . This project studies the automakers' optimal decisions on production quantity and credit dealing under dual-credit policy. In specific, based on game theory and optimization theory, we study an automaker's optimal decisions on production quantity and credit transaction with capacity limitation as well as multi-stage decisions on production quantity and credit carry-over with uncertain demand. We also study two automakers’ decisions on production quantity and credit cooperation with uncertain price. This project puts the production strategy of automakers in a totally new context and is expected to obtain new research results and reveal the new mechanism of enterprise operation and management, so as to further enrich the relevant research on production decisions of automakers. In addition, it can provide reference for domestic automakers to better deal with dual-credit policy in various complex environments, and help improve their market competitiveness.

为促进汽车产业的健康发展，2017年9月我国政府出台了《乘用车企业平均燃料消耗量与新能源汽车积分并行管理办法》（双积分政策）。该政策替代了政府补贴政策，显著改变了汽车制造商的生产运作环境。因此，研究新政策下汽车制造商的最优决策是一个重要的实际问题，然而目前关于双积分政策的理论研究却刚刚起步。. 本项目研究双积分政策下汽车制造商的最优产量和积分处理决策。基于博弈论以及最优化理论，具体研究了单个汽车制造商在产能限制条件下的产量和积分交易策略，以及需求不确定条件下多周期产量和积分结转决策，也研究了两个汽车制造商在价格不确定情形下通过期权合约进行积分合作的决策。本项目将汽车制造商的生产策略置于全新的背景下，预期将取得新的研究结果，并揭示企业运作管理的新机理，从而丰富车企生产决策的相关研究。同时,为国内汽车制造商更好地在各种复杂环境下应对双积分政策提供参考，从而提高市场竞争力。

旨在促进汽车行业节能减排的“双积分”政策实施以来，汽车制造企业的外部生产运营环境发生了显著变化，因此其生产和积分处理决策成为值得研究的重要问题。本项目以此为背景，研究了汽车制造商的产能计划与协调、贴牌生产和政府的补贴策略等一系列问题，取得了一系列新的发现。研究发现，产能预定契约和数量弹性契约，能够作为风险分担、鼓励制造商扩大产能、并提升供应链整体的绩效的机制。这两种契约能够比传统的、拥有更低灵活性的契约带来更大的利润。研究进一步表明，通过设定合理的参数，两种契约都能够实现供应链协同。此外，贴牌生产策略虽然加剧了市场竞争，但是使得传统燃油汽车企业和新能源汽车企业的利润相比直接购买积分情形有所增加。贴牌生产策略使得新能源汽车的市场增大，这说明贴牌生产策略有利于新能源汽车的发展和推广。收益共享契约无法协调贴牌生产策略带来的竞争冲突，但是两部定价契约可以使得系统达到协调。最后，如果政府的政策目标是最大化电动汽车的市场份额、最大化动力电池的回收率、最大化社会福利或者是最小化环境影响，则补贴给回收方是最优的补贴政策。相反，如果其政策目标是最大化电动汽车制造商的利润，则补贴给消费者是最优的补贴政策。相关学术成果发表于《International Journal of Production Economics》《Omega-The International Journal of Management Science》等国际权威学术期刊。