拍卖腐败的生成机理及其对资源配置效率的影响研究

Corruption in auction has become a worldwide hazard problem. This project will be taken into account in the complex corruption problem in auction which there are both the collusion among bidders and the moral hazard of auction agent. For the complex corruption appeared in the procurement auction with quality and price dimensional attributes, through establishes the collusion game model about the bidding strategies of quality between the bidders . Uses normatively research methods to deducte the procurement agent distorts the signal game mechanism between the auctioneer and the procurement agent, and formates the mechanism of complicated corruption in auction about the Interactions between the procurement agent and the bidding collusion gangs; For the complex corruption appeared in the first-price sealed bid auction, through establishes the game model, Uses normatively research methods to formate the mechanism of this complicated corruption in auction about the Interactions between the auction agent and the bidding collusion gangs; Reveals that the complex corruption in auction follows the laws.The Sample of corruptive auction is obtained by investigation, the related sample points are given according to characteristics of each point in corruptive auction sample, Getting the related sample.Use the comparative study and statistical analysis for the Sample of corruptive auction and it’s related sample. Construction the absolute indicators and relative indicators of the corruptive auction effect the resource allocative efficiency. given the impact of corruptive auction on the resource allocative efficiency; Then build an econometric model that contains the Dummy variable of corruptive auction effects the resource allocative efficiency, using Eviews6.0 software, further empirical research the the impact of corruptive auction on the resource allocative efficiency.

本项目将综合考虑拍卖中既有拍卖代理人的败德行为，又有投标者之间合谋的复杂拍卖腐败问题。针对采购具有质量、价格二维属性拍卖中出现的复杂腐败，通过建立既有投标者之间合谋又有拍卖代理人扭曲委托代理合同，并且投标合谋团伙与拍卖代理人之间行贿受贿的互动博弈理论模型，来研究采购拍卖中复杂腐败的生成机理；还建立博弈模型来演绎第一价格拍卖中出现的复杂腐败的生成机理；揭示复杂拍卖腐败遵循的规律；通过调查获得拍卖腐败样本，再根据每一个拍卖腐败样本点的属性特征，给出配对样本点，获取配对样本，对二者进行比较研究以及统计计量分析，构建拍卖腐败对资源配置效率影响的绝对指标和相对指标，给出拍卖腐败对资源配置效率的影响；再构建包含拍卖腐败虚拟变量对资源配置效率影响的计量经济模型，采用Eviews6.0 软件，进一步实证研究拍卖腐败对资源配置效率的影响;最后给出防止拍卖腐败的对策。

腐败破坏了拍卖的竞争性投标效果，拍卖腐败已经成为了一个世界性的危害问题。.项目系统梳理了国内外拍卖腐败的理论研究文献。通过建立公共采购委托人授权采购代理人实施：达到质量要求的最低报价投标商中标的委托代理合同的博弈模型，研究了既包含投标者之间合谋，又包含拍卖代理人与投标合谋团伙之间相互作用的复杂拍卖腐败的生成机理；通过构建包括公共采购委托人、公共采购代理机构以及投标供应商三方各主体期望收益合同的博弈模型,不仅研究了公共采购代理收费与公共采购拍卖腐败之间的关系，还分别探讨了公共采购拍卖参与三方各主体独立行动与彼此协作的不同行为选择。再从防止公共采购拍卖腐败发生的角度，设计了对公共采购代理人的最优激励机制。最后，给出了防止公共采购拍卖腐败发生的对策。项目从理论上披露了拍卖腐败对资源配置效率的影响；发现目前对采购代理人的激励机制是非激励相容的。.本项目将采购人、采购代理人和投标供应商三者共同纳入一个系统进行研究，理论上拓展了目前两者博弈的研究范围。而且本研究对于认识公共采购招投标各参与主体之间的相互关系、以及规范招投标市场都具有重要的现实意义。